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Abstract
This thesis explores the use of network coding for anonymous broadcast. Network
coding, the technique of transmitting or storing mixtures of messages rather than
individual messages, can provide anonymity with its mixing nature, efficiently dis-
seminate content in multicast and broadcast networks, and resiliently deliver messages
despite packet erasure and constrained network resources. While broadcast mediums
guarantee receiver anonymity, they are thought to be difficult to emulate efficiently
over unicast networks. This thesis introduces NCGAB, a decentralized peer-to-peer
overlay network based on network coded gossip that provides a resilient, anonymous
broadcast medium. Unlike most anonymous communication systems, NCGAB re-
quires no cryptosystem, no infrastructure of trust, and no special nodes to operate.
This thesis also introduces Melting Pad, an algebraic coding scheme with properties of
information theoretic security and efficient decodability, designed to protect messages
for wide dissemination and for hosting with diminished liability.
Thesis Supervisor: Muriel Medard
Title: Professor of Electrical Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Anonymity is becoming increasingly scarce on the Internet, but remains in high de-
mand to netizens evading censorship, to individuals who value privacy or freedom of
expression, and to operatives who carry out sensitive communications at the risk of
their well-being. Internet Service Providers have been known to monitor traffic and
blacklist hosts. The trend of cloud computing and its accompanying targeted ad-
vertising market have rendered the default Internet experience to be highly stateful,
with website visits regularly leaving a trail of footprints in the hands of untrusted
and unknown third parties. The property of anonymity in Internet communication
has become exclusively "opt-in," through the use of special systems like anonymizing
proxies and anonymizing transport layers.
However, there are few distinct systems for anonymous communication in active
use today, reflecting the challenge of their successful implementation and deployment.
Many are encumbered by implicit infrastructures of trust, by complicated protocols,
by correct implementation of cryptography, and by the requirement for pre-existing
coordinating and "Samaritan" nodes to operate.
A simpler and completely decentralized approach to anonymity is broadcast based.
Broadcast mediums intrinsically confer receivers with anonymity, but are difficult to
scale over an effectively unicast network, like the Internet. Past broadcast based
anonymity systems have required complicated network architectures to overcome this
scaling problem, and still pose a challenge to implement with their dependency on
15
cryptography and complexity.
Network coding, the technique of transmitting or storing mixtures of messages
rather than individual messages, is well suited to multicast and broadcast applica-
tions. It was shown that the technique is required in achieving the multicast capacity
of a network [5], which subsequently spawned abundant research that has yielded a
myriad of results and applications, such as correcting for network failures [27], cor-
recting errors on a packet erasure channel [33], peer-to-peer content distribution [16],
mixing messages for confidentiality [39], and more.
In chapter 2, we present network coding and its mechanics.
In chapter 3, we introduce NCGAB, a decentralized peer-to-peer system based
on network coded gossip that provides a resilient, anonymous broadcast medium.
Unlike most anonymous communication systems, NCGAB requires no cryptosystem,
no infrastructure of trust, and no special nodes to operate. The system's operation
can be summarized in a single page of pseudocode and is easy to implement.
In chapter 4, we introduce Melting Pad, an algebraic coding scheme with infor-
mation theoretic security designed to protect messages for wide dissemination and
hosting with diminished liability. Melting Pad supports flexible modes of secrecy,
with either distinct secret keys protecting each source block, or one common key pro-
tecting all source blocks. Melting Pad is derived from interference alignment concepts
to allowing for efficient separate decoding of every protected block.
In chapter 5, we summarize the contributions of this thesis and outline future
work.
16
Chapter 2
Network Coding
Network coding is the technique of transmitting or storing mixtures of packets rather
than individual packets.
In linear network coding, multiple packets are combined into algebraic linear com-
binations, transmitted or stored, and later decoded into their constituent packets by
solving a linear system constructed from their linear combinations. Linear network
coding allows for efficient distribution of content to one or more receivers through dis-
parate routes, and for successful delivery of content in spite of lost or missing packets
[27] [33].
We demonstrate the mechanics of linear network coding below. We select a finite
field Fq with q = 28 to carry out algebraic operations within. Packets of 5-bytes are
treated as I = 5 length vectors of elements in this finite field.
Xi =(209 121 6 2 156
X2= (154 8 52 248 236
X3 =(247 24 117 93 62
We may form linear combinations of the packets. If we choose the scalar coeffi-
cients such that the linear combinations are independent, then we can solve for all
three source packets from three linear combinations.
17
= 115x 1 + 227x 2 + 202x 3
= 39x 1 + 88x 2 + 236x 3
= 198x 1 + 98x 2 + 204x 3
L = (37 205
L2= (109 88
L3= (99 197
254 234 148)
15 179 54
57 126 29
Linear combinations of packets are collected into a decoding matrix and decoded
into their constituent packets with Gaussian elimination. Decoding will solve for none,
some, or all of the source packets, depending on the rank of the decoding matrix.
(37 205
= 109 88
(99 197
115 227
39 88
198 98
209 121
= (154 8
(247 24
254
15
57
2021
236
2041
6
2 24
117
234 148)
179 54)
126 29) T
(37 205
( 109 88
(99 197
2 156)
8 236)
93 62)
A received linear combination that is linearly independent of pre-existing linear
combinations in the decoding matrix is called innovative, as it increases the rank
of the decoding matrix, contributing new information that may be used to further
decode the constituent packets.
Random Linear Network Coding is a linear network coding technique that uses
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15
57
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179
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random coefficients when forming linear combinations of packets. This ensures, with
high probability and in a decentralized fashion, that newly formed linear combina-
tions of the same packets continue to be innovative to its receivers. [20] shows that
this approach achieves the maximum throughput of a multicast network. We uti-
lize random linear network coding in our decentralized anonymity system to create
mixtures of packets that are innovative with high probability.
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Chapter 3
NCGAB
3.1 Introduction
Many anonymous transport layers achieve anonymity by multiple hops of source
rewriting, in which messages pass through a number of relays to introduce suffi-
cient uncertainty about the sender. These systems are often encumbered by complex
infrastructures of trust and require Samaritan nodes to operate, making successful
deployments of them difficult, large, and highly visible to adversaries. The source
rewriting mechanism often requires cryptography, making its correct implementation
a challenge. The mechanism is often stateful, so packet flows will take pre-selected
rigid paths, posing the problem of traffic analysis.
An alternative approach to anonymous transport is broadcast, in which messages
have no explicit destination and are delivered to all participants. Broadcast mediums
guarantee receiver anonymity by design. However, the approach seems unreasonable
and difficult to implement efficiently over an effectively unicast network architecture,
such as the Internet. Past systems, like P 5 [37] and Herbivore [181, have addressed
the inefficiency in scaling a broadcast medium over a unicast network by partitioning
nodes into trees (P) or rings of cliques (Herbivore). This results in a complex network
architecture and these systems still must rely on cryptography.
Network coding, the technique of transmitting or storing mixtures of messages
rather than individual messages, is well suited to multicast and broadcast applica-
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tions. It was shown that the technique is required in achieving the multicast capacity
of a network [5], which subsequently spawned abundant research that has yielded a
myriad of results and applications, such as correcting for network failures [27], cor-
recting errors on a packet erasure channel [33], peer-to-peer content distribution [16],
mixing messages for confidentiality [39], and more.
We introduce NCGAB, a peer-to-peer overlay network that leverages network
coding to create a resilient, anonymous broadcast medium. Network coding's inher-
ent mixing property provides sender anonymity with no cryptography, and enables
efficient dissemination of content with a gossip protocol, altogether making a broad-
cast approach to anonymity viable and scalable. Its inherent redundancy confers the
system with resiliency, even in the presence of active attackers squandering network
resources and polluting the medium. NCGAB requires no infrastructure of trust and
no cryptosystem. It is completely decentralized, free of coordinating, trusted, and
Samaritan nodes and thus immediately deployable. Its implementation is simple and
summarized in a single page of pseudocode. Comprehensive simulations show it to
be highly resilient, providing an available broadcast medium for 10 to 100 peers, even
when 30% of the peers are operated by active attackers.
This paper is outlined as follows: The Related Work section reviews related work
on anonymity and network coded gossip. The System Overview section presents a
high-level description of the NCGAB system and its properties. The Network Coding
Tools section introduces the tools of network coding and homomorphic hashing used
by NCGAB to achieve its functionality and guarantees. The System Architecture
section outlines the design of the system in detail. The Analysis of Anonymity section
investigates the anonymity of participants using the system. The Analysis of Attacks
section investigates the efficacy of different attacks in compromising the availability of
the system. The Simulations and Results section presents simulations of the system
and results that demonstrate its availability and resiliency.
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3.2 Related Work
Current anonymity systems can be broadly separated into three categories: specific
applications, outproxies, and overlay networks. Specific applications include persis-
tent data stores like Freenet [11] and GNUnet [6], remailers like Mixmaster [34] and
Mixminion [12], or file sharing like OneSwarm [22]. These rely on an anonymous trans-
port layer, but do not expose it for more general applications. Outproxies provide
generic IP connectivity to a host on the public Internet. Overlay networks provide
anonymous communication between a closed set of participants with an application-
agnostic transport layer, which applications like file sharing, instant messaging, email,
etc. can be built upon.
These systems have employed two fundamental strategies for achieving anonymous
transport.
The first strategy, which is used by the majority of anonymity systems, is source
address rewriting, in which intermediate nodes function as relays that forward data on
behalf of an originator or another relay. This may happen in one-hop, with a trusted
centralized proxy like the Anonymizer [1] outproxy, or in multiple hops. In multiple
hop source rewriting systems, packet flows either take an indiscriminate random path
through the relays, as in the case of the outproxy Crowds [36], or follow a pre-selected
path, called tunnels or circuits, through available relays, as in the case of the original
mixnet idea by Chaum [10], the Onion Routing scheme [35], the outproxies Tor [14],
Hordes [29], Tarzan [15], and the overlay network 12P [2], as well as the overlay
network of Tor's hidden services mode [14]. These multiple hop tunnel systems use
some implementation of mixnets or onion routing, a scheme in which the addresses
of intermediate relays and the final destination are hidden under layers of encryption
that are peeled off at each relay, revealing the address to forward the packet to.
These systems (except for Crowds [36], which operates in plaintext), require cryp-
tography to hide the intermediate and final destination addresses. Most of these
systems also require special "Samaritan" nodes to function, which operate as free
relays on behalf of the system's users, and introduce the problem of maintaining a
23
trusted directory of the relays. In addition, the stateful nature of the multiple hop
tunnel approach also makes traffic analysis a serious problem to be addressed.
The anonymous data store Freenet [11] uses a source address rewriting system with
multiple hops to retrieve the data associated with a key in the distributed data store.
However, it differs from the outproxies and overlay network systems mentioned above
in that the path a request takes is determined by a routing table at each peer, instead
of a pre-selected path. Each peer which forwards the request for that key closer to a
likely owner of the key, who answers with a reply that returns back through the path
the request took to its origin.
The other fundamental strategy for achieving anonymous transport has been
broadcast, in which messages are delivered to all receivers. Broadcast mediums intrin-
sically confer receivers with anonymity, and so this shifts the problem of anonymity to
concealing the sender. However, broadcast mediums are inefficient to implement over
a unicast network, such as the Internet. Some systems have tried to leverage the mul-
ticast functionality built into IPv4, like Hordes [29], which uses multiple hop source
rewriting in the forward path, but IPv4 multicast for the return path of data. Build-
ing an application with multicast today faces the challenges of configuring network
hardware.
p5 [37] and Herbivore [18] are anonymous overlay networks based on broadcast.
They address the problem of scaling a broadcast medium over unicast connections by
partitioning participants into a tree, in the case of P5 , or a ring of small "cliques" in
the case of Herbivore. P5 users encrypt their messages for their receiver with public-
key cryptography, broadcast their messages to a subset of the tree, and use dummy
traffic to mask transmission timing. Herbivore users broadcast in their local clique
with a generalization of the dining cryptographer networks (DC-nets) [9] protocol,
a secure scheme for transmitting information with sender anonymity. Herbivore's
implementation of it requires public-key cryptography.
These systems do not require Samaritan nodes, but they have more complex
network architectures (trees and rings of cliques) and protocols, compared to those
of the source rewriting systems. They also depend on public-key cryptography.
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Figure 3-1: NCGAB Overlay Network
In the field of network coding and anonymity, [38] extends the idea of fixed trans-
mission schedules for session anonymity, by sending network coded traffic instead of
dummy cover traffic. The paper demonstrates significant gains in throughput.
Gossip based protocols for message dissemination originated in [21], and network
coded gossip protocols have been explored in [26], [25], [13]. [13] characterizes the
benefits in efficiency of gossiping network coded messages rather than individual mes-
sages.
3.3 System Overview
The Network Coded Gossip for Anonymous Broadcast (NCGAB) system is a decen-
tralized peer-to-peer overlay network that provides a resilient, anonymous broadcast
medium. It is built on a random linear network coded gossip protocol. NCGAB is
designed for broadcasting messages among small to medium-sized groups, e.g. 10 to
100 participants, but may also be used as a network layer for unicast or multicast
sessions carried within the broadcast. Participants may contribute messages with
NCGAB and expect the system to deliver those messages to all other participants
with high probability and with timeliness.
NCGAB does not provide data confidentiality; participants are expected to en-
crypt the data they wish to hide. We assume anonymity and confidentiality to be
orthogonal problems.
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Figure 3-1 illustrates the star network structure of an NCGAB network, showing
NCGAB peers gossiping asynchronously with one another.
3.3.1 Anonymous
NCGAB guarantees unconditional receiver anonymity by its broadcast design, and
features sender anonymity that improves as the network scales. NCGAB achieves this
by strategically introducing new messages and always mixing a participant's messages
with those of other participants.
3.3.2 Decentralized
NCGAB utilizes a peer-to-peer network coded gossip protocol to efficiently dissemi-
nate messages among its participants. NCGAB is unique in achieving its properties
in that it has a completely decentralized architecture, aside from its bootstrapping
mechanism. The system does not require a key-based cryptosystem, an infrastructure
of trust, Samaritan, coordinating, or trusted nodes to operate. The only trust is in
the client software executed by each peer.
3.3.3 Highly Available
The primary metric of NCGAB's successful operation is availability: the average
percentage of participants that will successfully decode a message inserted into the
broadcast medium by another participant. Simulations show that NCGAB achieves
near 100% availability on a cooperative network, with an average delay of under 5
gossip rounds, while supporting a wide range of network sizes without a change in its
system parameters.
NCGAB ensures the continued availability of the broadcast medium by its gossip-
ing strategy and participant cooperation, which enforce the ephemerality of messages.
We call the broadcast medium ephemeral, because messages do not persistent on the
medium, and the active messages on the medium change over time.
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3.3.4 Resilient
NCGAB is highly resilient to uncooperative participants, or Byzantine adversaries
attempting to compromise the availability of the medium by pollution of valid or
invalid content. NCGAB recognizes and discards invalid content, and simulations
show it can sustain an availability of well over 60% when 30% of the network is
operated by independent adversaries actively polluting the network. This resiliency
holds across a wide range of network sizes (10 to 100 peers) without a change in
system parameters.
3.4 Network Coding Tools
3.4.1 Network Coded Gossip Protocols
A gossip protocol achieves the dissemination of one or more messages among a group
by exchanging "gossip" in multiple rounds. Gossip is considered any message a node
previously received from another node. A node sends gossip to, or receives gossip
from, a random subset of the group on each round. [13] outlines the protocol of a
basic Random Message Selection gossip system, in which a node transmits one of its
previously overhead messages to another node in each round. [13] shows that such a
Random Message Selection gossip system with n nodes and k distributed messages
among the nodes takes e(n log(n)) rounds of gossip to disseminate all k messages
(where k = 0(n)).
A network coded gossip protocol exchanges linear combinations of messages in
its rounds of gossip, instead of whole messages. As sufficient linear combinations are
collected, nodes are able to decode messages and encode new linear combinations over
a different subset of decoded messages. [13] outlines a protocol of a basic Random
Linear Coding gossip system, in which a node transmits a linear combination of
previously decoded messages to another node in each round. [13] shows that such
a Random Linear Coding gossip system with n nodes and k distributed messages
among the nodes take O(n) rounds of gossip to disseminate all k messages (where
27
k = O(n)).
NCGAB is based on a Random Linear Network Coding gossip protocol, but in-
corporates modifications for anonymity and content integrity. These are documented
in the System Architecture section, below.
3.4.2 Homomorphic Hashes
A homomorphic function is a function that also maps certain operations at the in-
put to certain operations on the output. For example, a function may exhibit this
homomorphism:
H(aM1 + 3M 2 ) =H(M1)'H(M2)"
A cryptographic hash function with a homomorphism that maps the hash of a
linear combination at its input to some function of constituent message hashes at
its output, like in the example homomorphism above, is particularly well suited for
verifying the integrity of linear combinations formed with linear network coding.
For example, a receiver may verify a linear combination of message vectors M, and
M 2 with scalar coefficients a and 3 it received, by testing the equality in the equation
above. That is, by computing the homomorphic hash of the linear combination, and
comparing it to the same hash derived from the function's homomorphic mapping,
involving the coefficients a and 3 and individual message hashes H(M1 ) and H(M 2 ).
This allows a receiver to verify the integrity of any linear combination of M1 and M 2 ,
with the knowledge of the constituent message hashes.
[28] presents a homomorphic hash function for rateless erasure codes, [17] presents
one for linear network coding, which exhibits the homomorphism exemplified above.
[40] [7] [4] [24] describe homomorphic signature schemes. These systems may be
used with a preshared key between the sender and the receiver, so the receiver may
authenticate linear combinations formed by intermediate untrusted nodes.
NCGAB identifies messages by their homomorphic hashes, and includes this iden-
tification with every transmitted linear combination to allow for peers to verify the
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Figure 3-2: NCGAB Ephemeral Message Window Structures
integrity of the linear combinations, and thereby prevent the pollution of invalid con-
tent by attackers.
3.5 System Architecture
In the subsections below, we describe the relevant architectural details of the NC-
GAB system. We intentionally omit details of underlying transport and network
layer protocols (e.g. TCP/IP), as well as the initial bootstrapping mechanism that
determines the participating peers of the overlay network, as these choices are flexible
and implementation-specific. For now, we assume the NCGAB client is bootstrapped
with a list of participating peers, and that the list is static.
We call NCGAB client the software that runs on each participating peer in the
NCGAB overlay network. We call a decoded message any message that is decoded by
an NCGAB client from linear combinations it received from the overlay network. We
call a contributed message any message that is inserted by an NCGAB client into the
29
TTL
7
5
3
0
0
O*Wet
overlay network. We refer to the application as the user of the NCGAB client, which
receives decoded messages from, and possibly contributes messages to, the broadcast
medium provided by the NCGAB system.
3.5.1 Gossip and Decoding Strategy
NCGAB achieves a shared broadcast medium by network coded gossip. Each par-
ticipant in the system gossips to a randomly selected subset of the group at regular
intervals, asynchronously of the other participants. The size of this random sub-
set is expressed as a percentage. The duration between gossip rounds expressed in
seconds. These are the system parameters LOOKUPPERCENT and GOSSIPINTERVAL,
respectively.
Gossip is pushed by participants: on its gossip round, the participant connects to
each member of the randomly chosen subset and transmits gossip. The choice to push
gossip, rather than pull it (connect and ask for gossip), is not arbitrary and ensures
greater anonymity in the system. We justify this design choice in more detail in the
Analysis of Anonymity section.
The gossip transmitted by a participant consists of one linear combination: either
a newly formed linear combination from messages the participant has decoded or
contributed, called new-gossip, or a linear combination selected from gossip the
participant has previously received, called re-gossip. New-gossip introduces new
innovative linear combinations of decoded messages into the network, while re-gossip
helps disseminate existing linear combinations throughout the network.
All new-gossip is formed from a fixed number of decoded messages. This number
is the system parameter CODESIZE. Since all re-gossip originates from new-gossip,
all linear combinations that exist in the overlay network are coded with CODESIZE
number of messages.
Participants periodically execute a decoding routine. This routine arranges all
decoded messages and all undecoded linear combinations into a matrix and carries
out Gaussian elimination to decode new messages. This may yield zero or more newly
decoded messages.
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3.5.2 Ephemeral Message Window
The gossiping and decoding strategy outlined above is sufficient to implement a
shared broadcast medium, and guarantees the anonymity described in the Analy-
sis of Anonymity section, but quickly exhibits unacceptable delay and computational
overhead as the number of messages contributed to the medium grows. This is in great
part due to newer messages having decreasing probability of selection in new-gossip.
In addition, past messages are recoded and re-transmitted among the participants,
forming cycles that consume bandwidth. Furthermore, new messages may be coded
with very old messages, requiring increasingly large decoding matrices to decode.
In order to ensure the continued availability of the medium, tractable decodability,
and reasonable delays, the NCGAB system implements a pruning strategy that limits
the number of active messages in the overlay network. This is achieved with a client-
side data structure we call an ephemeral message window, shown in Figure 3-
2. This data structure is core to the operation of the NCGAB system. Each client
maintains two of these windows: one Decoded Window, for messages that are decoded
from the network or contributed by the application, and one Gossip Window, for linear
combinations that are received from the network.
Items inserted into these windows are tagged with a time-to-live field: a lifetime
expressed as an integer number of gossip rounds. On each gossip round, the time-
to-live of every item in the Decoded and Gossip Windows is decremented. When
an item's time-to-live reaches zero, it is flagged expired. Expired messages in the
Decoded Window are not coded into new-gossip, but are saved and still used for
future decoding. Expired linear combinations in the Gossip Window are not selected
for re-gossip, not used for future decoding, but are retained for some time to prevent
their re-insertion.
Decoded and contributed messages are inserted into the Decoded Window with
an initial time-to-live of the system parameter TTLDECODED. Only new messages may
be inserted in the Decoded Window - the time-to-live of expired are not reinstated,
nor is the time-to-live of unexpired messages updated, if they are decoded again.
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Linear combinations received from the network are inserted into the Gossip Win-
dow, filed under the source peer address they originated from, with an initial time-
to-live of the system parameter TTLGOSSIP. Only new linear combinations may be
inserted in the Gossip Window. Like the Decoded Window, the time-to-live of an
expired or active linear combinations is not reinstated or updated if it is received
again.
The Gossip Window structure differs slightly from the Decoded Window structure
by the organization of linear combinations under source peer addresses, but otherwise
the time-to-live mechanism functions identically. See Figure 3-2 for an example.
The ephemeral message window structures restrict the lifetime of messages on
the broadcast medium which, in turn, quenches any cycles of linear combinations
containing messages that all participants have already decoded. This is because
the insertion policy for the Decoded Window prohibits inserting messages that have
already expired. A message will eventually expire in the Decoded Windows of all
participants, and will not be coded into new-gossip. The insertion policy for the
Gossip Window also prohibits inserting expired linear combinations, so any remaining
gossip circulating the network that contains the message decoded by all will eventually
expire as well.
3.5.3 Amended Gossip Strategy
The NCGAB gossip strategy is essentially the same as previously described, except
that gossip is formed or drawn from the ephemeral windows. Each participant trans-
mits one linear combination, either new-gossip or re-gossip chosen with equal proba-
bility, to a random subset of the network on every gossip round. The gossip is selected
anew for every peer contacted from the random subset. New-gossip is formed by cod-
ing CODE-SIZE number of unexpired messages from the Decoded Window. Re-gossip
is chosen by selecting an unexpired linear combination from the Gossip Window.
The unexpired messages selected to form new-gossip are randomly selected from
the Decoded Window, weighted by their time-to-live. Re-gossip is chosen by first
randomly selecting a source peer addresses in the Gossip Window, followed by a
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random selection of a linear combination under that peer address, weighted by time-
to-live. This re-gossip selection strategy enforces fair re-gossiping in the system, so
that a polluting attacker cannot dominate the gossip traffic with only his or her linear
combinations.
If there are an insufficient number of messages in the Decoded Window to form
a linear combination comprised of CODE-SIZE messages, then randomly generated
messages are added to the Decoded Window until it has at least CODESIZE messages.
In simulations, we have found that this is only required at initialization, when the
Decoded Window at all peers is empty. In that case, the dummy messages bootstrap
the gossiping process.
Randomly selecting messages from a skewed distribution weighted by their time-
to-live, rather than from a uniform distribution, improves the availability of the
medium and helps diaganolize the decoding matrix of the participants. Its effect
is shown in the Simulations and Results section.
Altogether, the ephemeral message window data structure and corresponding gos-
sip strategy yield an ephemeral broadcast medium that can sustain new messages
contributed to the medium over time.
3.5.4 Message and Packet Structure
1024 bytes 4 bytes
Figure 3-3: Example Message Structure
A message in NCGAB is represented by a fixed length sequence of bytes with no
header. A message is identified only by the homomorphic hash of its contents, which
is unique for an instantiation of an NCGAB overlay network with high probability,
and enables the Decoded Window to track expired messages and enforce its insertion
policy. Figure 3-3 illustrates the structure of a message.
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A linear combination in NCGAB is represented by a list of constituent messages
hashes, a list of scalar coefficients, and the data containing the linearly combined
messages. Linear combinations are also uniquely identifiable, as they are comprised
of uniquely identifiable messages. The integrity of a linear combination structure can
be verified by computing the homomorphic hash of its data, and comparing it to a
second hash derived from the coefficients and constituent message hashes. The second
hash is computed with the homomorphism exhibited by the hash function.
I 4 bytes =1
Figure 3-4: Example Gossip Packet Structure
Each gossip communication transmits a linear combination in a packet. A packet
only contains the encoding of the linear combination structure described above. For
example, Figure 3-4 illustrates a gossip packet with a CODESIZE of 4, 4-byte message
hashes, 1-byte scalar coefficients, and a 1024-byte linear combination.
When an NCGAB client receives a gossip packet, it verifies the hashes of the
encoded linear combination. NCGAB clients discard packets with invalid linear com-
binations.
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3.5.5 Message Contribution by Application
The CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL system parameter specifies the rate at which an applica-
tion should contribute a new message to the NCGAB to be inserted into the broadcast
medium. It is expressed in number of gossip rounds. An application contributes a
message to NCGAB by adding the message to the Decoded Window with a time-to-
live of TTLDECODE.
Together, the CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL and GOSSIPINTERVAL system parameters
determine the maximum throughput of a participant on the broadcast medium, as-
suming that the other system parameters are selected appropriately and the rest of
the participants cooperate.
3.5.6 System Parameters
Table 3.1: NCGAB System Parameters
Parameter Name Description
GOSSIPINTERVAL Duration of time between gossip rounds
LOOKUPPERCENT Percentage of peers to contact each gossip round
CODESIZE Number of messages to code into new-gossip
TTLDECODE Initial time-to-live of items in Decoded Window
TTLGOSSIP Initial time-to-live of items in Gossip Window
CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL Number of rounds between message contributions
Table 3.5.6 gathers all of the system parameters in the NCGAB system. It is
important to note that these system parameters can only be enforced in client-side
software, because the NCGAB system is completely decentralized. Nevertheless, we
will show in simulations that it is in the best interest of participants to cooperate
on a common set of system parameters to maximize availability of the medium for
themselves and all other participants. Clients that do not cooperate with the chosen
system parameters are regarded as adversaries, and their effect on the system is
analyzed in detail in the Analysis of Attacks section.
The system parameters that govern the ephemerality of the NCGAB broad-
cast medium and rate of dissemination require tuning to ensure both the stability
and successful decodability of messages contributed to the medium. For example,
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if the Decoded Window time-to-live parameter, TTLDECODE, is too small, or the
CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL is too high, some messages may expire before sufficient lin-
ear combinations of them are formed and gossiped to allow for their decoding by
other participants. Alternatively, if the Decoded Window or Gossip Window time-
to-live parameters are too large, the windows may grow too quickly, as messages are
contributed to the medium faster than they are expired.
The aggregate behavior of the NCGAB system depends on all of its system pa-
rameters. At first glance, it may seem daunting to choose set of parameters that yield
a highly available broadcast medium. However, extensive simulations show that it is
not difficult to construct a parameter set that achieves a highly available medium for
all participants, supporting a network size ranging from 10 to 100 peers.
3.5.7 System Pseudo-code
Despite the added complexity of the ephemeral message window data structures,
the NCGAB system can still be easily summarized and implemented. Figure 3.5.7
documents the high-level Python-like pseudocode of the system described above.
3.6 Analysis of Anonymity
In this section, we clarify our definitions of anonymity and analyze the receiver and
sender anonymity of participants in the NCGAB overlay network.
We assume message contents cannot be correlated with a sender or a receiver. We
take unconditional receiver anonymity to mean that the traversal of a particular
message in the overlay network cannot be correlated with its intended receiver, and
unconditional sender anonymity to mean that the traversal of a particular message
in the overlay network cannot be correlated with its sender. These properties are
assessed from a bird's eye or omniscient point of view of message traversal over the
overlay network.
It is prudent to note that any participation in an overlay network designed for
anonymity might be considered as sufficiently implicating an attempt at anonymous
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Figure 3-5: NCGAB System Pseudocode
Peers = []
Decoded-Window = Window()
GossipWindow = Window()
# Gossip receiving thread
def thread-receiveo:
while True:
gossip = network.recv()
# If the gossip hash verifies
if validate(gossip) == True:
if gossip not in GossipWindow:
GossipWindow.add(gossip, TTLGOSSIP)
decode()
# Gossip sending thread
def threadgossipo:
while True:
# Decrement TTL of objects in windows
for msg in DecodedWindow:
if DecodedWindow[msgl.ttl > 0:
DecodedWindow[msgJ.ttl -= 1
for lc in GossipWindow:
if GossipWindow[lc].ttl > 0:
GossipWindow[lc].ttl -= 1
# Keep our Decoded Window filled to CODESIZE
if length(DecodedWindow) < CODESIZE:
for i = 0 to CODESIZE-length(Decoded_Window):
DecodedWindow.add(RandomMessageo, TTLDECODE)
# Look up a random subset of our peers
subset-peers = lookup-random(Peers, LOOKUPPERCENT)
for peer in subset-peers:
# Either code new-gossip or send re-gossip
if random.coinflip() == True:
gossip = DecodedWindow.code-random(CODESIZE)
else:
gossip = GossipWindow.choose-random()
network.send(peer, gossip)
sleep(GOSSIPINTERVAL)
# Decode the gossip window
def decodeo:
matrix = DecodingMatrix()
# Add solved rows of messages from Decoded Window
for msg in DecodedWindow:
matrix.addSolvedRow(msg)
# Add unsolved rows of linear combinations
# from Gossip Window
for lc in GossipWindow:
matrix.addCombination(lc.data, lc.coefficients)
# Gaussian Elimination
decoded = matrix.eliminate()
# Add newly decoded messages to Decoded Window
for msg in decoded:
if msg not in Decoded-window:
DecodedWindow.add(msg, TTLDECODE)
<Deliver decoded msg to application>
# Application hook for contributing a message
def contribute(message):
DecodedWindow.add(message, TTLDECODE)
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Figure 3-6: NCGAB Overlay Network Graph
communication. We assume that such participation is tolerated, that the act of
participating in the network is not considered a compromise of anonymity, and that
the participant's concerns of anonymity are regarding the origination and delivery of
messages within the overlay network.
We model the NCGAB overlay network as a graph of participating peers repre-
sented as nodes, interconnected with links. A link exists between every node, because
a node may gossip with any subset of the entire overlay network. For brevity, to
observe a message on a link means to observe a linear combination on the link that
references that message in its list of constituent message hashes. See the Message and
Packet Structure subsection of the System Architecture section for more information
on structure of transmitted linear combinations. Refer to Figure 3-6 for an example
model of an NCGAB overlay network with five nodes.
3.6.1 Traffic Analysis by an Omniscient Adversary
First, we consider the threat model of an omniscient adversary that may observe all
messages exchanged on all links. This is to assess whether or not NCGAB possesses
unconditional receiver anonymity and unconditional sender anonymity, as defined
above.
NCGAB trivially guarantees unconditional receiver anonymity, because the sys-
tem is designed to provide a broadcast medium, which does not employ any concept
of specific destinations. The system's goal is to disseminate the contributed message
of any participant to every other participant, by having each participant gossip to
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a random subset of the network on each round. The random subset contacted by
each participant on each round may or may not include the intended destination for
a message, but that distinction only exists from a purely semantic, not technical,
point of view, and we assume that message contents cannot be correlated with their
intended destination.
The NCGAB system does not have sender anonymity when subject to traffic
analysis by an omniscient adversary. An omniscient adversary may pinpoint the
introduction of a message, identified by its hash, to a linear combination leaving a
particular node on the network, before that same linear combination is re-gossiped,
or the message is later decoded from sufficient linear combinations and recoded into
new-gossip by other peers.
3.6.2 Traffic Analysis by a Limited Adversary
We now consider the threat model of a more limited adversary, which may operate
one or more participants on the NCGAB overlay network, and can only observe the
messages sent on the links to these participants. Unconditional receiver anonymity
is still clearly guaranteed by the same argument as in the case of the omniscient
adversary. We investigate the kind of traffic analysis a limited adversary may perform
to correlate the original sender with a message, and with what certainty he or she
may do so.
Importance of the Push Gossip Mechanism
The decentralized nature of NCGAB prevents peers from enforcing the LOOKUP-PERCENT
parameter, which defines the size of the randomly chosen subset each participant gos-
sips to on each gossip round. This means that an adversary is able to make connections
to 100% of the overlay network and push gossip to them, without recourse, on every
gossip round, since peers are incapable of detecting or preventing these asynchronous
connections. The most a peer can enforce is the GOSSIPINTERVAL parameter on in-
bound connections, by rejecting inbound connections that occur more frequently than
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the parameter specifies.
We provide this context to make the point that if the NCGAB gossiping strategy
relied on a pull mechanism, rather than a push mechanism, then an adversary would
be able to pull gossip from every peer on every gossip round. This would allow the
adversary to isolate the introduction of a particular linear combination containing
a new message to its source with higher probability, but not necessarily with the
certainty that an omniscient adversary can. There is still a chance that the contacted
peer does not code the new message it is responsible for contributing in the gossip
pulled from it by the adversary. That peer may then code the new message into gossip
that is delivered to another peer that gossip round, asynchronously, which would
introduce uncertainty on the origin of the linear combination when the adversary
observes it later.
Employing a push mechanism for gossiping limits the information of message
ownership available to an adversary, and increases the uncertainty in the sender of a
message. A peer will only expose LOOKUP-PERCENT of the overlay network on one round
to the introduction of a linear combination containing a message it is responsible for
contributing. The linear combinations containing that message will be disseminated
second-hand from then on, increasing the uncertainty about the original sender of the
message.
Uncertainty Regarding Sender
NCGAB leverages two uncertainties to protect the anonymity of a sender.
The first uncertainty is whether the linear combination gossiped by a peer is new-
gossip or re-gossip. If it is new-gossip, the peer must possess the decoded message,
because it created a new linear combination containing it. If it is re-gossip, then the
peer may or may not posses the decoded message.
The second uncertainty is whether a message that was coded into new-gossip was
contributed by that peer or decoded from linear combinations that peer received.
Both of these uncertainties increase with each round after the introduction of a
message, because other peers will begin to re-gossip linear combinations containing
40
it, as well as eventually decode it and code it into new-gossip themselves.
Intuitively, the greater presence an adversary has on the overlay network, the less
uncertainty there is in identifying the sender of a particular message on a particu-
lar round. In future work, we will develop an expression for the probability of an
adversary witnessing the introduction of a message contributed by a particular peer.
3.7 Analysis of Attacks
In this section, we analyze the potential of attacks carried out by one or more ad-
versaries participating in an NCGAB overlay network. The Simulations and Results
section including the results from simulations of the more effective attacks discussed
here, which pose a potential threat to NCGAB's operation and availability.
All attacks at the NCGAB system level require the attacker's participation in
the overlay network, otherwise the attacker cannot send or receive gossip to/from
the participants. The Analysis of Anonymity section investigated the efficacy of
passive traffic analysis, so we focus on active attacks in this section. We consider
active attacks to be any action carried out by an adversary with intentional deviation
from the NCGAB protocol or the cooperative system parameters, in an effort to
compromise the availability of the broadcast medium.
3.7.1 Threat Model, Attack Vectors, and Goal of an Adver-
sary
Our threat model considers one or more independent adversaries participating on
the NCGAB overlay network. By independent, we mean that the adversaries do not
collude in mounting their attack. We address colluding adversaries in the subsection
Pollution with Colluded Decodable Gossip.
We assume that adversaries have unique network addresses and cannot spoof other
network addresses. This is to model the typical case of a Wide Area Network in which
users are connected through Internet Service Providers that prohibit spoofing. A more
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serious adversary may have the power to spoof network addresses, but we put this
aside for now. The rigid structure of the NCGAB packets and the simplicity of the
system expose few attack vectors for an adversary. Most of the system parameters
govern client-side structures that are not directly accessible to an adversary. We
assume that an adversary may transmit arbitrary linear combinations to any number
of peers (exceeding LOOKUP-PERCENT) within a gossip round. The decentralized nature
of NCGAB prevent peers from detecting or preventing asynchronous connections
exceeding LOOKUPPERCENT of the network. We assume that an adversary cannot
contact a peer more than once within a gossip round, as these excessive connections
can be detected by a peer.
The goal of the adversary is to disable or diminish the availability of the NC-
GAB broadcast medium. One strategy to achieve this is to consume the network
resources that would otherwise be used to disseminate content. The Inactive Peer
subsection describes this. In addition to this, an adversary may try to actively disrupt
or dominate the content on the medium. The Pollution attack subsections address
various approaches to this. We assume all of these attacks may be multiplied by the
adversary, by operating more independent participants on the network (e.g. a Sybil
attack).
We simulate the most promising attacks to empirically determine their effect on
the NCGAB system, and discuss those results in the Simulations and Results section.
3.7.2 Inactive Peer
An inactive peer attacker receives gossip from peers on the network but does not
send useful gossip to peers. In effect, this attacker wastes the bandwidth of peers
and hampers the dissemination of legitimate content on the network. We note that
a disconnected peer may also function as an inactive peer.
Simulations in the Simulation of an Inactive Peer demonstrate that there exist
system parameters for which the NCGAB system may tolerate many inactive peers,
without affecting the availability of the medium.
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3.7.3 Pollution with Invalid Gossip
Pollution with invalid gossip is an attacker's attempt at corrupting a participant's
decoding of one or more messages by contributing invalid linear combinations that
claim to provide information for legitimate messages. An attacker carrying out this
attack is also an inactive peer, that is, the attack does not aid in dissemination
of legitimate content on the network. A participant that inserts an invalid linear
combination into his or her decoding matrix may later decode one or more messages
incorrectly with that row.
NCGAB prevents this by identifying messages solely by the hash of their contents,
and including this identification with the linear combination encoded in each packet
(see Message and Packet Structure subsection). This enables clients to verify received
linear combinations by computing the homomorphic hash of the linear combination
and comparing it to a second hash derived from the coefficients and constituent
message homomorphic hashes included with the linear combination. This makes it
exceedingly difficult for an attacker to craft a linear combination with invalid content
that still hashes correctly.
We assume that this attack is infeasible, as its detection is enforced by the message
hashing incorporated in the NCGAB protocol.
3.7.4 Pollution with Old or Underdetermined Gossip
Pollution with old gossip or underdetermined gossip is an attacker's attempt at circu-
lating irrelevant content that fills all of the Gossip Windows of participants, which in
turn leads to that content's re-gossip on the network. As before, an attacker carrying
out this attack is also an inactive peer. Old gossip are linear combinations of messages
the broadcast medium has previously delivered to its participants. Underdetermined
gossip are insufficient linear combinations of randomly generated messages, chosen
such that the randomly generated messages cannot be decoded.
Old gossip may be decoded by a participant into a valid message, but the message
will not be inserted into the participant's Decoded Window if it has been decoded
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in the past and expired. Underdetermined linear combinations are unlikely to be
decoded into messages, by their construction. Therefore, either kind of gossip will
only temporarily persist in the Gossip Window of participants.
NCGAB's selection strategy for re-gossip limits the effectiveness of this attack,
because NCGAB will randomly choose from available peer source addresses in the
Gossip Window, before randomly choosing a linear combinations under that address.
This means that the cooperative portion of the network will fairly re-gossip contri-
butions from adversaries and legitimate participants alike.
Simulations in the Simulation of Pollution with Underdetermined Gossip demon-
strate the effect of multiple underdetermined gossiping attackers. We observe that
the net effect is similar to that of the Inactive Peer attack, and that NCGAB tolerates
it without losing availability.
3.7.5 Pollution with Decodable Gossip
Pollution with decodable gossip is an attacker's attempt at circulating gossip that will
be decoded as quickly as possible, in an attempt to flood the Gossip and Decoded
Windows of all participants. We consider this to be the most formidable attack of
one or more independent attackers on NCGAB.
As before, an attacker carrying out this attack is also an inactive peer. In the
pollution with decodable gossip attack, an adversary generates CODE-SIZE number
of random messages, and transmits a linear combination of them to every peer for
CODESIZE gossip rounds. After CODESIZE gossip rounds, the peers will successfully
decode the generated messages and insert them into their Decoded Window. By
then, peers will have also inserted CODESIZE linear combinations into their Gossip
Window. The adversary then generates new CODE-SIZE number of random messages,
and repeats the process over the next set of gossip rounds. This is the fastest rate at
which an independent adversary can fill the ephemeral message windows of all peers.
Simulations in the Simulation of Pollution with Decodable Gossip section demon-
strate the effect of this attack with multiple independent adversaries. We show that
increasing the CODE-SIZE system parameter improves NCGAB's resiliency to this
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attack, and that the system is able to maintain availability even when 30% of the
network is operated by independent adversaries carrying out this attack.
3.7.6 Pollution with Colluded Decodable Gossip
A derivative of the Pollution with Decodable Gossip attack is one that involves mul-
tiple colluding attackers, rather than independent attackers. Independent attackers
polluting with decodable gossip can only fill the Decoded Window of all participants
with CODESIZE messages in CODESIZE gossip rounds. However, every colluding ad-
versary adds an additional opportunity in a gossip round to deliver decodable gossip
in less than CODE-SIZE gossip rounds, by having the adversaries code over the same
messages. We consider this to be the greatest threat to the availability of the NCGAB
broadcast medium.
Future work will include simulations that characterize the effect of multiple col-
luding attackers polluting decodable gossip.
3.8 Simulations and Results
The stochastic nature, ephemeral message windows, and multiple system parameters
of the NCGAB system make it challenging to model the system analytically and derive
closed-form expressions for the effect of its system parameters. We opted instead to
analyze NCGAB empirically, by developing a comprehensive simulation of the system.
In this section, we present the basic design of an NCGAB system simulator and the
results of a comprehensive simulation the system, which demonstrates the system's
ability to provide a highly available and resilient broadcast medium.
3.8.1 ncgabsim Simulator
The ncgabsim simulator was developed in Python3 [3] and totals approximately 900
lines of code, 460 of which are the implementation of the peer client, and the rest of
which are for statistic collection and event logging. The simulated client implements
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the architecture described in the System Architecture section, as well the implied
finite field arithmetic and Gaussian elimination routines to support random linear
coding and decoding. The arithmetic routines comprise the majority of the client
code. We chose not to implement homomorphic hashing to verify linear combinations
on the network, as its role is straightforward and not relevant in assessing the behavior
of the system and the effect of its various parameters. The complete simulator source
code is provided in ncgabsim Simulator Code.
The simulator models every peer of the NCGAB network with its own Decoded
Window, Gossip Window, and packet input queue. These three containers comprise
the entire state of an individual peer. The network is modeled with perfect links,
implemented by a list containing the references to each peer's input queue object. A
peer may put a packet in any other peer's input queue.
The simulation does not model the message contents, but does model the distinc-
tion between contributed messages, randomly generated dummy messages, and linear
combinations of messages. Messages are tagged with randomly generated unique
identifiers, which simulate the hash they would be identified by in the real system.
The simulator tracks the origin of all messages for the purpose of collecting statistics
of their dissemination. The simulation implements random linear coding, including
the underlying finite field arithmetic and Gaussian elimination, for a Rijndael GF(28 )
field. Peers faithfully solve linear combinations with Gaussian eliminations to decode
their constituent packets.
The simulation runs by executing rounds of gossip, in which every peer performs
the following routine: contribute a new message if its contribution timeout has ex-
pired, receive gossip from its input queue and add it to its Gossip Window, attempt to
decode its current Gossip Window, and gossip with a random subset of the network.
The simulation is a good approximation of the real system, so long as the events
it models for each peer (decoding, sending gossip, etc.) are not time-constrained by
the GOSSIPINTERVAL. Simulating rounds of gossip, rather than realtime connectivity,
produces results that are more fundamental to the system and independent of timing
variation that may depend on implementation. For each round of gossip, the simula-
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Table 3.2: Available ncgabsim Simulation Parameters
Parameter Name Description
SIMWARMUP-DECODES Number of message decodes before recording starts
SIM-DURATIONINSERTS Duration of the simulation in terms of messages contributed by peers
SIM-NUMPEERS Total number of peers in the overlay network
LOOKUPPERCENT Percentage of peers to contact each gossip round
CODESIZE Number of messages to code into new-gossip
TTLDECODE Initial time-to-live of items in Decoded Window
TTLGOSSIP Initial time-to-live of items in Gossip Window
CONTRIBUTE-INTERVAL Number of rounds between message contributions
tion processes peers in a random order, to model the asynchronous transmission and
arrival of gossip in a real network.
All system parameters documented in the System Parameters subsection of the
System Architecture section are modeled and tunable in the simulation, with the
exception of GOSSIPINTERVAL, because the simulation simulates rounds of gossip
instead of realtime connectivity. The simulation first warms up by simulating rounds
until a DURATIONWARMUPDECODES number of messages have been decoded throughout
the network. The simulator then begins to track statistics for DURATIONINSERTS
number of contributed messages. These message statistics include the round the
message was inserted, which peers decoded it, and on which round those peers decoded
it. The simulation runs until these tracked messages have expired from the entire
network. This statistics collected are later post-processed to determine the average
availability and delay of the broadcast medium.
The simulator also collects statistics regarding the size of the Decode and Gossip
Windows, the size of decoding matrices, which messages were used in the decoding
matrix, and the number of decoded results from Gaussian elimination of a decoding
matrix. This data is post-processed to assess the stability of the system by checking
that ephemeral message windows do not exhibit unreasonable or unbounded growth,
which would pose significant computational overhead for decoding and may indicate
instability.
Table 3.8.1 summarizes the parameters available in the simulation for tuning.
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3.8.2 Availability and Delay
We define availability as the average percentage of peers that decode an inserted
message. It represents, on average, how likely an inserted message will be successfully
broadcast to all peers. The delay represents, on average, how many gossip rounds
it will take for an inserted message to be decoded by a peer, given that it will be
successfully decoded by it.
The availability and delay are computed with the statistics collected from
DURATIONINSERTS number of tracked messages.
3.8.3 Cooperative Peer Simulations
The main goal of the cooperative peer simulations were to characterize the typical
behavior of the NCGAB system: how its availability and delay vary with respect to
the system parameters. The second goal was to find a set of system parameters for
which there is nearly 100% availability with reasonable delay.
We began by fixing two parameters: LOOKUPPERCENT to 0.25, and CODESIZE to
4. Setting LOOKUP-PERCENT to a fraction of less than 0.50 was in an effort to limit the
demands on each peer for each gossip round, especially for larger networks. Setting
CODESIZE to 4 seemed to be a reasonable trade-off between sufficient mixture of par-
ticipant content for sender anonymity, while limiting the computational complexity
of decoding at each peer and the runtime of the simulation.
We explored parameters of TTLDECODE and TTLGOSSIP with several trial runs of
the simulation, until we observed successful decoding on the network for a variety of
network sizes. We fixed TTLDECODE to 30 and TTLGOSSIP to 10, so decoded packets
persist longer than gossip coded from them. These choices yielded a system that was
highly scalable, from 10 to 100 peers.
This leaves the CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL parameter, the duration in rounds of gossip
participants should wait before contributing a new message, or the inverse of the max-
imum rate at which an adversary should introduce messages, as well SIMNUM2PEERS,
as the number of peers in the overlay network to be the free variables. We chose
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CONTRIBUTE-INTERVAL to be the independent variable in the cooperative peer simula-
tions, while availability and delay are the dependent variables, and SIMNUM-PEERS is a
parameter. Table 3.8.3 summarizes the parameter sweep. Figure 3.8.3 show availabil-
ity versus CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL parametrized by SIM-NUMPEERS, and delay versus
CONTRIBUTE-INTERVAL parametrized by SIMNUMPEERS. The plots are formed from
averaging 5 runs of the simulation initialized with different seeds. 95% confidence
intervals are provided around each data point.
Table 3.3: Cooperative Peer Simulation Parameters
Parameter Name Value
SIMWARMUPDECODES 50
SIM-DURATIONINSERTS 100
SIMNUMPEERS [10, 25, 50]
LOOKUP-PERCENT 0.25
CODESIZE 4
TTLDECODE 30
TTLGOSSIP 10
CONTRIBUTE-INTERVAL [7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20, 22]
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Figure 3-7: Cooperative Peer Simulation
The results of this simulation demonstrate that the set of system parameters
tabulated above and a CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL of 22, corresponding to the right most
points in the plots, yield a broadcast medium with near 100% availability and under
5 gossip rounds of delay for networks that range from 10 to 50 peers.
The simulations below explore the gossip window random selection strategy and
the effect of various attackers on the system.
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Figure 3-8: Uniform versus Weighted Item Random Selection Simulation
3.8.4 Simulation of Uniform versus Weighted Item Selection
Table 3.4: Uniform versus Weighted Item Random Selection Simulation Parameters
Parameter Name Value
SIMWARMUPDECODES 50
SIMDURATIONINSERTS 100
SIMNUMPEERS 25
LOOKUPPERCENT 0.25
CODE-SIZE 4
TTLDECODE 30
TTLGOSSIP 10
CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL [7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20, 22]
NCGAB chooses messages from its Decoded Window and linear combinations
from its Gossip Window randomly when forming new-gossip or selecting re-gossip.
This simulation compares a uniform versus weighted by time-to-live random selection
strategy for items in the Decoded and Gossip Windows. See Figure 3.8.4 for results.
The greatly improved availability justifies the choice of a weighted by TTL selection
strategy. The plots are formed from averaging 3 runs of the simulation initialized
with different seeds. 95% confidence intervals are provided around each data point.
3.8.5 Simulation of an Inactive Peer
This simulation investigates the effect of increasing numbers of inactive peer attackers
on the system, as described in Inactive Peer subsection of the Analysis of Attacks
section on availability and delay. We use a CONTRIBUTE-INTERVAL of 20, and the
other parameters from the cooperative peer simulation, as this resulted in a nearly
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Figure 3-9: Inactive Peer Attackers Simulation
100% available medium in the cooperative case. See Figure 3.8.5 for results. Inactive
peers have little effect on availability and delay of the medium. The plots were
formed from averaging 3 runs of the simulation initialized with different seeds. 95%
confidence intervals are provided around each data point.
3.8.6 Simulation of Pollution with Underdetermined Gossip
Table 3.6: Pollution with Underdetermined Gossip Simulation Parameters
Parameter Name Value
SIMAWARMUPDECODES 50
SIMDURATIONINSERTS 75
SIM-NUMPEERS [10, 20, 30]
LOOKUPPERCENT 0.25
CODESIZE 4
TTL_DECODE 30
TTLGOSSIP 20
CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL 20
This simulation investigates the effect of increasing numbers of inactive peers
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Parameter Name Value
SIMWARMUPDECODES 50
SIMDURATIONINSERTS 75
SIMNUMPEERS [10, 20, 30]
LOOKUPPERCENT 0.25
CODESIZE 4
TTLDECODE 30
TTLGOSSIP 20
CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL 20
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Figure 3-10: Pollution with Underdetermined Gossip Simulation
that also pollute with underdetermined gossip, as described in Pollution with Old or
Underdetermined Gossip subsection of Analysis of Attacks section, on availability and
delay. See Figure 3.8.6 for results. Like ordinary inactive peers, inactive peers that
also polluting underdetermined gossip have little effect on availability and delay of the
medium. The plots were formed from averaging 3 runs of the simulation initialized
with different seeds. 95% confidence intervals are provided around each data point.
3.8.7 Simulation of Pollution with Decodable Gossip
Table 3.7: Pollution with Decodable Gossip Simulation Parameters
Parameter Name Value
SIMWARMUP-DECODES 50
SIMDURATIONINSERTS 75
SIMNUMPEERS 20
LOOKUPPERCENT 0.25
CODESIZE 4
TTLDECODE 30
TTLGOSSIP 10
CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL 20
This simulation investigates the effect of increasing numbers of inactive peers that
also pollute with decodable gossip, as described in the Pollution with Decodable
Gossip subsection of the Analysis of Attacks section, on availability and delay. See
Figure 3.8.7 for results. Inactive peers polluting decodable gossip have a significant
effect on the availability of the system. The plots were formed from averaging 3
runs of the simulation initialized with different seeds. 95% confidence intervals are
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Figure 3-11: Pollution with Decodable Gossip Simulation
However, additional simulations show that increasing the CODESIZE parameter of
the system can compensate for the effect of pollution with decodable gossip. Figure
?? presents the results of the same simulation, but with CODESIZE of 6, instead of 4.
This shows that the system can be made resilient to multiple independent attackers
polluting with decodeable gossip.
53
12
0
12
12
12SC
CC
12
5.
100
80
60
40
20
0
54
Chapter 4
Melting Pad
4.1 Introduction
The investigation into the security afforded by random linear network coding (RLNC)
is ongoing [31] [39] [32] [19], but the systems for confidentiality built with RLNC to
date concern protecting packet streams in an active session between sources and
sinks. This work explores the use of RLNC to code data into a secure form suitable
for wide dissemination or persistent storage. It achieves this with a basic application
of interference alignment.
We introduce Melting Pad, an algebraic coding scheme that protects multiple data
blocks while allowing for their separate decoding. It features two modes of secrecy:
one in which protected blocks can be separately decoded by distinct secret keys, and
one in which protected blocks can be separately decoded by a common secret key.
The mode is chosen simply by the designation of whether the coefficients or a seed
block are secret.
Related work includes protocols based on random linear network coding for se-
curity and their analysis. [39] presents SPOC, a RLNC protocol that provides data
confidentiality by protecting the coefficients of linear combinations, and still allows
intermediate nodes to perform network coding operations. [32] analyzes the confi-
dentiality afforded by SPOC in more detail. [30] presents a secure RLNC protocol
inspired by SPOC for wireless video streaming. [8] debuts interference alignment for
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a wireless interference channel.
This chapter is outlined as follows: The Interference Alignment section intro-
duces the basic concept of interference alignment with network coding. The Melting
Pad Coding and Decoding section presents the Melting Pad encoding and decoding
scheme. The Confidentiality section makes brief statements on the confidentiality of
Melting Pad. The Applications section proposes several applications of the coding
scheme. The Extensions section introduces several extensions to the scheme.
4.2 Interference Alignment
Interference alignment in linear network coding is the technique of coding packets
with strategically introduced linear dependence, called interference, to enable more
efficient decoding for a subset of the source packets.
Decoding one network coded source packet often requires solving a system that
involves many linear combinations. For example, take x1 , x2, and x 3 to be three
vectors representing source packets, and cij to be scalar coefficients chosen in forming
linear combinations of the source packets. Three source packets can be encoded into
linear combinations as
L- a1 ,1x 1 + 01, 2x 2 + ai,3x 3
L2 - a 2 ,1x 1 + a 2 ,2x 2 + a 2 ,3x 3
L3 a 3 ,1x 1 + a3 ,2x 2 + a3 ,3x 3
x 1, x 2 , and x 3 may be decoded from the three linear combinations by solving:
1 -1 -
Xi a 1 ,1 OEl,2 01,3 L1
X2 ~a 2 ,1 a 2,2 a 2 ,3 L 2
LX 3 J [a 3 ,1 a 3,2 a 3,3 [L 3]
In the general case, decoding any one or all of the source packets x1 , x2 , and x 3
requires all three linear combinations L 1, L2, and L3.
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Linear combinations of x1, x 2, and x 3 may be formed in such a way so that x1
and x2 only require two linear combinations to decode, and x 3 requires three. For
example, take aj, ,j, and 7yi to be scalars, and form linear combinations as
K1 = a1x 1 + cZ2 x 2 + a3x 3
K 2 =3 1x1 + 7 1 (OZ2 x 2 + a 3 x3)
K 3 =3 2x 2 + 7y2 (ixI + a 2x 3)
Then, x 1 , x 2 , and x3 may be decoded with:
x, = (K1 - 2
7Y1 al + 1/'Y1
X2 =(K1 - 3
72 - 2 + 32/72
X3 - (K 1 - K 2 / 1) a 2 (Ki - K3/7 2 )
as3 (aI + V1/f1 C2 + 2/72
In this case, x1 and x 2 each require two linear combinations for decoding instead
of three, while x 3 requires three. It is said that the linear combinations Ki and K2
have the interference terms OZ2 x 2 + a 3 x3 aligned by 71,. Likewise, Ki and K3 have
the interference terms CeIx 1 + a 3x 3 aligned by 72.
4.3 Melting Pad Coding and Decoding
Take x1, ..., x,, to be n input vectors of length I representing source blocks, Oa and fi
to scalar coefficients, and m, ... , m, to be n + 1 output vectors. All vector elements
and scalars belong to a finite field Fq, with q = 2"'. a and /i are non-zero randomly
selected, uniformly distributed scalars from Fq.
Melting Pad codes n source blocks xj, ..., x,, into n+ 1 protected blocks m, ... , mn
in the following way:
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MO = c 1x1 + a 2x 2 + a3 X3 + ... anXn
Mi = IXI + '1 (1 aixi)
i71
M 2 = 02X 2 +
Mn = OnX2 +
72( aiXi)
i#2
Zn OiX i )
i 4n
The n source blocks X1 , ... , xi-, can then be decoded with:
X- - -
(2
X2 = M - -
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mn
Xn = MO- -
7n
1
a1 + /13i
1
a 2 + /2/72
1
an + /7n
4.3.1 Example
For example, if n = 3, then we can encode x 1 , X2 , and X3 with Melting Pad to:
MO o1X1 + a 2 X2 + G3 X3
Mi1 = IX1 + 'YI(a 2 X2 + a 3 X3 )
M 2 = 02 X2 + Y2(a1X1 + a 3 X3)
M 3 =3 3 X3 + Y3 (a1Xi + a 2 X2)
and decode with:
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X1 -- m o ~ - ---
(1 _ 1 7
xlY Ce~ a 1 3 /'~yi
X2 = (i - - 2  1
^2 OZ2 +/2/72
X3 (M 0 - -3)
73 OZ3 +3 173
4.3.2 Explanation
The Melting Pad coding scheme forms block m, called the seed block, as a random
linear combination of all source blocks. This seed block can be thought of as a "self-
keying" pad made from the linearly combined sum of the source blocks. Each source
block xi is padded by this seed block to form a protected block mi. This is done by
aligning all terms in the seed block, except the source block's own aixi, as interference
under the scalar 7i. This interference alignment yields a 2x2 system for every pair of
seed block and source block, summarized as:
mO a x i + P
Mi = Oixi + 7,P
where P is the "pad," the linearly combined the sum of all other source blocks.
This system will be invertible, and therefore each protected block will be decodable,
so long as ai, /i, and -y are selected such that the determinant a7y - fi is non-zero.
We assume that any construction of a Melting Pad will select random coefficients
until this is true.
4.3.3 Security
The security in Melting Pad comes from designating the per source block coefficients
a, fi, and -yi to be secrets, designating the seed block to be secret, or both to be
secret. The choice of which to designate as the secret depends on the application.
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Below, we illustrate the possible designations of secrets with the previously pre-
sented n = 3 example.
If we choose to designate the per source block coefficients to be the secrets, then
each block may be decoded separately with a unique key comprised of the aj, 0j, and
-y coefficients:
Ciphertext Secret Key Decoding
Mil a,3 1,y1  f (MO, li, ai, i, 71) - Xi
M2 2 ,3 2 ,72  f(mO, M2, 2 , 12, ^2) - X2
M3 3,3 3 ,'7 3  f(mO, M3, a 3, 13, 'y3) - X3
If we choose to designate only the seed block to be secret, then all blocks can be
decoded with a common key, the seed block:
We may also choose to designate both the seed block and per source block coeffi-
cients to be secret.
The size of the key, and therefore the absolute information theoretic security of
the scheme, will differ between the two designations. Using the coefficients as the key
results in many smaller keys, but allows for decoding the protected blocks separately.
Using the seed block as the key results in a larger key, but can decode all protected
blocks.
4.4 Confidentiality
This section presents basic statements on the confidentiality of source blocks when
protected by the Melting Pad scheme.
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Ciphertext Secret Key Decoding
M0 o
mn, 01,01,1 - f(mO, mi, ai, iV 1) X1
112, V2,02,'Y2 - f (mO, M2, a 2 , /2, 72) - X 2
M13, s,0 3 ,Y7 3 - f (mO, i3, a 3 , 33 173) - X 3
The information theoretic security of Melting Pad depends on the statistical prop-
erties of its source data blocks. We first investigate the Maximal Security of Melting
Pad, and then consider what kind of source blocks can achieve it.
4.4.1 Maximal Security
In this subsection, we show that the Melting Pad scheme has maximal security when
the linear combinations it produces, Mi, ... , mn, are statistically independent and
uniformly distributed, and their coefficients are drawn form a uniform distribution.
We first consider the case of designating the per source block coefficients to be the
secret keys. In this case, an attacker has access to all M, ... , mn linear combinations,
and is attempting to decode xi, which is formed by
(M - iMi ±1
xii = m+ - -
The right multiplicand amounts to a scalar, so this equation can be re-ai+/3i/y
written in terms of the two scalars El and E2 :
Xi = (MO - -i) E2
Since the coefficients are drawn from a uniform distribution, the attacker has no
information about the secret key. In addition, if mo and mi are independent, they
provide no information on xi. Therefore, the attacker must resort to guessing Ci and
E2 with brute force enumeration to decode xi. These scalars live in the finite field Fq
with q = 2m elements, so the effective search space for an attacker attempting brute
force decoding is 2 2m
We now consider the case of designating the seed block to be the secret key. In
this case, an attacker has access to mi, ... , m, linear combinations and the aj, 03, ' j
coefficients, but not the mo linear combination. The attacker is attempting to decode
xi and knows mi, aj, /3, and gi used in its encoding.
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If mo and mi are independent, mi provides no information on mo or xi. In
addition, because mo is uniformly distributed, the attacker has no information about
the secret key. The attacker is left with guessing mi, which is a vector of length 1
with elements in finite field Fq with q = 2'. The effective search space for an attacker
attempting brute force decoding is 21m.
When Melting Pad exhibits maximal security, the search space and corresponding
difficulty of brute force decoding a Melting Pad protected block can be made arbi-
trarily large. In the case of per source block coefficients used as secret keys, this is
by the choice of the finite field size q = 2"n. In the case of the seed block used as a
secret key, it is by choice of source block length 1 and finite field size q = 2".
4.4.2 Achievability of Maximal Security
The previous subsection showed that the Melting Pad linear combinations must be
independent and uniformly distributed for maximal security. However, the statistical
properties of these linear combinations depend on the statistical properties of their
source blocks xj, ... , x,.
First, we consider the requirement for uniformly distributed linear combinations.
It is clear that linear combinations of uniformly distributed source blocks will be
uniformly distributed, and that in the general case, the distribution of a linear com-
bination is the convolution of its source block distributions. The best case for maximal
security with Melting Pad is uniformly distributed source blocks, as this guarantees
uniformly distributed linear combinations m, ..., m,.
Second, we consider the requirement for statistically independent linear combi-
nations. This is a more difficult requirement to investigate, but we can establish its
achievability in the case of uniformly distributed and statistically independent source
blocks.
[23] presents a generalized version of the Skitovich-Darmois theorem for finite
Abelian groups, which proves that if linear combinations of independent random vari-
ables with values in a finite Abelian group are independent, then the random variables
must be uniformly distributed. While our question concerns the converse: if indepen-
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Figure 4-1: Subscriber Content Delivery Application
dent, uniformly distributed source blocks will yield independent linear combinations,
the theorem proves that both properties can exist simultaneously.
The best case for maximal security in Melting Pad is uniformly distributed, inde-
pendent source blocks, but this is an unrealistic requirement for typical data. Future
work will investigate how linear combinations of source blocks with arbitrary distri-
butions and dependence and affect security, especially as the number of source blocks
increase.
4.5 Applications
In this section, we present two applications that are well-suited to the Melting Pad
coding scheme and demonstrate the utility of two of the secret designations described
in subsection Security. In the Subscriber Content Delivery application, a content
provider transmits content on a broadcast medium to all subscribers, but portions of
the content should only be accessible to its entitled subscribers. In the Secure Storage
on Untrusted Servers application, content is securely stored on multiple untrusted
servers.
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4.5.1 Subscriber Content Delivery
Figure 4-1 illustrates a subscriber content delivery system. Such systems often use
a downstream broadcast medium, which the Melting Pad scheme is well-suited for
because of the separate decodability of protected blocks that it offers. This application
of Melting Pad uses per source block coefficients as the secret key to each protected
block, which enables fine-grain and agile access control to subscribers in the system.
A content provider may deliver new secret keys to its subscribers through a back-
channel, which immediately enable a subscriber's decoding of the protected blocks
associated with the delivered keys. Furthermore, a channel provider can regularly
rotate secret keys to allow for a means of revoking channel access. Secret keys can be
generated deterministically with a seeded secure pseudorandom number generator to
limit the communication required for key assignment.
4.5.2 Secure Storage on Untrusted Servers
Figure 4-2 illustrates the secure storage of data blocks on multiple untrusted servers.
This application of Melting Pad uses the seed block as the secret key to each of the
protected blocks. The Melting Pad scheme enables the separate decoding of each
protected block with one common key.
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4.6 Extensions
In this section, we present extensions to the Melting Pad scheme that enable addi-
tional applications. "Grow" and "Shrink" allow for encoding an additional source
block into an existing Melting Pad and removing a decoded source block from an
existing Melting Pad, respectively, at the expense of publicizing the per source block
-yi coefficient. "Onion" presents a variation of Melting Pad scheme that features onion
decoding, which automatically shrinks the Melting Pad on each decoded source block.
"Onion" does not require publicizing any additional coefficients.
4.6.1 Grow
By publicizing the per source block coefficient 7yi with each protected block, a Melting
Pad can be extended with a new source block x+,. The extension procedure is:
1. Select non-zero random coefficients an+1, 3 n+1, and 7n+1
2. Form the additional protected block mn+1
3. Amend m 0 by adding the term aO+ 1 xn+1
4. Amend each mi for i = 1,...,n by adding the term -Na+1Xn+1
which yields the amended Melting Pad,
-0 m 0 + an1Xg
Mi = MO + xn+1Xn+1
Mi = a Mi +'-in+lXgi
Mn+1 = n+lXngi + 'Yn+I(MO
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4.6.2 Shrink
By publicizing the per source block coefficient -y with each protected block, a Melting
Pad can be shrunk from n to n -1 protected blocks upon decoding Xk. The retraction
procedure is:
1. Remove mk
2. Amend mo by subtracting the term akXk
3. Amend each mi for i f k by subtracting the term YiakXk
which yields the amended Melting Pad,
MO = MO - akXk
Mi = Mi - 'yiakXk
mk= Removed
-n - 'YnakXk
4.6.3 Onion
A slight variation on the Melting Pad coding scheme, called Melting Pad onion,
constructs protected blocks that decode like an onion: decoding the outer nth block,
removing it, and amending mo, yields a Melting Pad onion containing n -1 protected
blocks. The decoding equation for x, remains unchanged from the original scheme,
and this scheme does not require publicizing additional per source block coefficients.
The modified coding scheme codes blocks like this:
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MO GRR + aO1x1 + c 2x 2 + a 3x 3 +-- .. nxn
M1 - / 1XI + ll(aRR)
M2 2 X 2 + '}2(ozRR + aqx1)
The onion decoding procedure is:
1. Decode x, -(M -
- ) a , as usual
2. Remove mn
3. Amend m 0 by subtracting the term ckXn
which yields the amended Melting Pad onion,
MO =M - ckXn
Mi =Mi
Mn-I =Mn-I
Mn =Removed
Much like onion routing [35], this extension may be appropriate for a decentralized
trust system. For example, an intermediate node that possesses the key to the outer
most block receives the onion, decodes the outer block, subtracts it out, and then
forwards the smaller onion to the next node, which has the key for the next outer
block.
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M-- OnX 2 + -Yn(ozRR +
n-1
Yag xi)
1
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 NCGAB Conclusion and Future Work
In chapter 3, we motivated the issues in source rewriting anonymity systems with mul-
tiple hops and considered an alternate class of anonymity systems based on broadcast.
This approach has previously been met with challenges in scaling a broadcast medium
over unicast networks.
The technique of network coding was introduced, as well as its accompanying tools
of network coded gossip and homomorphic hashing. We described the architecture
of NCGAB, a decentralized peer-to-peer system based on network coded gossip that
provides a resilient, anonymous broadcast medium. NCGAB is unique in that it
does not require a cryptosystem, infrastructure of trust, or special nodes to operate,
and has a simple implementation summarized on Figure 3.5.7. NCGAB's anonymity,
efficiency, and resiliency is owed to its core protocol based on network coded gossip.
In the Analysis of Anonymity section, we investigated the anonymity of partici-
pants using NCGAB, showing that it has unconditional receiver anonymity due to its
broadcast design, and conjectured that its sender anonymity scales with size of the
cooperative network. The Analysis of Attacks section comprehensively described the
threats of active attackers attempting to compromise the system.
Simulations showed NCGAB to be highly scalable on a single set of system pa-
rameters, supporting networks ranging from 10 to 100 peers. Simulations also showed
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that NCGAB was highly resilient to the attackers described in the Analysis of Attacks
section.
Future work on NCGAB will simulate the effect of attackers with colluded decod-
able pollution, quantify NCGAB's sender anonymity with more rigor, further explore
the behavior of its system parameters, and investigate the practical implementation
of a homomorphic hash function to ensures the integrity of gossip exchanged on the
NCGAB overlay network.
5.2 Melting Pad Conclusion and Future Work
In chapter 4, we introduced Melting Pad, an algebraic coding scheme with informa-
tion theoretic security properties, efficient decoding, and flexible modes of secrecy.
Melting Pad codes n source blocks into n + 1 protected blocks, which can be decoded
individually, either each with separate, small keys or all with a common large key,
depending on what information is designated secret. Melting Pad is derived from
interference alignment concepts to achieve its property of efficient decodability.
Two potential applications of Melting Pad were presented: one for subscriber
content delivery over a broadcast medium, which called for agile channel access control
and was well suited to Melting Pad's secret key per source block mode, and one for
distributed untrusted storage, which mapped well to a Melting Pad's common secret
key mode.
We introduced extensions to the Melting Pad scheme that allow for its growth
and shrinking, at the expense of publicizing one of the per source block coefficients,
and an extension that enabled onion decoding.
We presented the preliminary results of an investigation into the confidentiality
of Melting Pad, establishing the requirements for its maximal secrecy and the corre-
sponding difficulty for an attacker to break it. We showed that when Melting Pad
has maximal secrecy, an attacker must resort to a brute force search for the secret
key. This search space can be made arbitrarily large by choice of the finite field size
q - 2 m in the case of per source block secret keys, or by a combination of choosing
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the field size q = 2" and the source block vector length I in the case of a common
secret key.
Future work on Melting Pad will investigate the information theoretic guarantees
of Melting Pad in the more general case of source blocks, especially arbitrarily dis-
tributed and statistically dependent ones. We suspect that the mixing property of
random linear combinations may help to homogenize the distribution of the linear
combinations as the number of source blocks grow, resulting in acceptable security.
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Appendix A
ncgabsim Simulator Code
A.1 ncgabsim.py
1 #!/usr/bin/python3
2
3 # NCGAB Simulator - Ivan A. Sergeev
4
5 import threading
6 import random
7 import json
8 import sys
9 import copy
10 import os
11 import queue
12
13 import ff
14
15 import termcolor
16
17 ################################################################################
18
19 simConfig = 4
20
21 # Cooperative Peer Simulation
22
23 SimTemplate = {
24 'NAME':
25 'DESC':
26
27 'LOOKUP-PERCENT': 0.25,
28 'CODESIZE': 4,
29 'TTLDECODE': 30,
30 'TTLGOSSIP': 10,
31
32 'SIMNUM-PEERS': 0,
33 'SIMNUM-EVILPEERS': 0,
34 'CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL': 0,
35
36 'SIMWARMUPDECODES': 50,
37 'SIMDURATIONINSERTS': 100,
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38
39 'SEED': 0,
40
41 'PRINT-LOG': False,
42 }
43
44 if simConfig == 1:
45 NumPeersSweep = [10, 25, 50, 100]
46 NumPeersSweep = [75]
47 ContributeIntervalSweep = [7.0, 10, 12.0, 15.0, 17.0, 20.0, 22.0]
48 ContributeIntervalSweep = [17, 20, 22]
49 SeedSweep = [Ox1, Ox2, Ox3]
50
51 SimParamsList []
52 for numPeers in NumPeersSweep:
53 for contributeInterval in ContributeIntervalSweep:
54 for seed in SeedSweep:
55 name = "Sim-Nd-R7.d-S7.d" 7. (numPeers, contributeInterval, seed)
56 params = copy.deepcopy(SimTemplate)
57 params['NAME'J = name
58 params['SEED'] = seed
59 params['SIMNUMPEERS'] = numPeers
60 params['CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL'] = contributeInterval
61 SimParamsList.append(params)
62
63 if simConfig == 7:
64 NumPeersSweep = [25]
65 ContributeIntervalSweep = [7.0, 10, 12.0, 15.0, 17.0, 20.0, 22.0]
66 SeedSweep = [Oxi, Ox2, Ox3]
67
68 SimParamsList = []
69 for numPeers in NumPeersSweep:
70 for contributeInterval in ContributeIntervalSweep:
71 for seed in SeedSweep:
72 name = "SimSelect2-Nd-Rd-S7d" % (numPeers, contributeInterval, seed)
73 params = copy.deepcopy(SimTemplate)
74 params['NAME'] = name
75 params['SEED'] = seed
76 #params['SELECTION'] = 'Uniform'
77 params['SELECTION'J = 'Weighted'
78 params['SIMNUMPEERS'] = numPeers
79 params['CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL'] = contributeInterval
80 SimParamsList.append(params)
81
82 ################################################################################
83
84 # Evil Peer Simulations
85
86 SimTemplate {
87 'NAME': "Evil-Base",
88 'DESC':
89
90 'LOOKUPPERCENT': 0.25,
91 'CODESIZE': 4,
92 'TTLDECODE': 30,
93 'TTL-GOSSIP': 20,
94
95 'SIMNUMPEERS': 0,
96 'SIMNUMEVIL-PEERS': 0,
97 'CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL': 20,
98
74
'SIMEVILPEERTYPE':
'SIMWARMUPDECODES':
'SIM.DURATION-INSERTS':
'PRINTLOG':
50,
75,
False,
}
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
numPeers, pNumEvilPeers, seed)
* params['SIMNUMPEERS'])
# Decodable with CODESIZE = 4
if simConfig == 3:
EvilPeerTypeSweep = ["decodable"]
NumPeersSweep = [25]
pNumEvilPeersSweep = [0.0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30]
SeedSweep = [Ox1, Ox2, Ox31
SimParamsList = []
for evilPeerType in EvilPeerTypeSweep:
for numPeers in NumPeersSweep:
for pNumEvilPeers in pNumEvilPeersSweep:
for seed in SeedSweep:
name = "Evil-Xs-CS4-Nd-E%0.2f-Sd" % (evilPeerType, numPeers, pNumEvilPeers, seed)
params = copy.deepcopy(SimTemplate)
params['NAME'] = name
params['SEED'] = seed
params['SIMNUMPEERS'] = numPeers
params['SIMNUM-EVILPEERS'] = int(pNumEvilPeers * params['SIM_NUM_PEERS'])
params['SIM_EVILPEER_TYPE'] = evilPeerType
params['CODESIZE'] = 4
SimParamsList.append(params)
# Decodable with CODE-SIZE = 6
if simConfig == 4:
EvilPeerTypeSweep = ["decodable"]
NumPeersSweep = [25]
pNumEvilPeersSweep = [0.0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30]
SeedSweep = [Oxi, Ox2, Ox3]
SimParamsList = []
for evilPeerType in EvilPeerTypeSweep:
for numPeers in NumPeersSweep:
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# Inactive, Underdetermined Gossip
if simConfig == 2:
EvilPeerTypeSweep = ["inactive", "underdetermined"]
NumPeersSweep = [10, 20, 30]
pNumEvilPeersSweep = [0.0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30]
SeedSweep = [Ox1, Ox2, Ox3]
SimParamsList = [
for evilPeerType in EvilPeerTypeSweep:
for numPeers in NumPeersSweep:
for pNumEvilPeers in pNumEvilPeersSweep:
for seed in SeedSweep:
name = "Evil-Ys-N/d-EY.0.2f-S'd" % (evilPeerType,
params = copy.deepcopy(SimTemplate)
params['NAME'] = name
params['SEED'] = seed
params['SIMNUM_PEERS'] = numPeers
params['SIM_NUMEVIL_PEERS'] = int(pNumEvilPeers
params['SIM_EVIL_PEER_TYPE'] = evilPeerType
SimParamsList.append(params)
for pNumEvilPeers in pNumEvilPeersSweep:
for seed in SeedSweep:
name = "Evil-%s-CS6-Nd-E%0.2f-Sd" % (evilPeerType, numPeers, pNumEvilPeers, seed)
params = copy.deepcopy(SimTemplate)
params['NAME') = name
params['SEED'] = seed
params['SIMNUMPEERS'] = numPeers
params['SIMNUMEVIL_PEERS'] = int(pNumEvilPeers * params['SIM_NUM_PEERS'])
params['SIMEVILPEERTYPE'] = evilPeerType
params['CODESIZE'] = 6
SimParamsList.append(params)
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SimParamsList = []
for evilPeerType in EvilPeerTypeSweep:
for numPeers in NumPeersSweep:
for pNumEvilPeers in pNumEvilPeersSweep:
for seed in SeedSweep:
name = "Evil-7.s-CS6-NXd-EO.2f-Sd" % (evilPeerType, numPeers, pNumEvilPeers, seed)
params = copy.deepcopy(SimTemplate)
params['NAME') = name
params['SEED'] = seed
params['SIMNUMPEERS'] = numPeers
params['SIMNUMEVIL-PEERS'] = int(pNumEvilPeers * params['SIMNUMPEERS'])
params['SIMEVILPEER-TYPE'] = evilPeerType
params['CODESIZE'] = 8
SimParamsList.append(params)
class Statso:
def __init__(self, simParams, simEventStop):
# Statistics collected
self.message-inserts = [1
self.message-decodes = {}
self.matrix-reduces = []
self.window-sizes = [3
self.last-message-exists = {}
self.round-finished = 0
# Simulation parameters
self.simParams = simParams
self.simEventStop = simEventStop
def message-track(self, rnd, decoded-objects, gossip-objects):
if len(self.message-decodes) < self.simParams['SIM-WARKUPDECODES']:
return
if len(self.message-inserts) < self .simParams['SIM_DURATION_INSERTS']:
return
# If the last message disappeared in the previous round, signal
# simulation stop
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# Colluded Decodable with CODESIZE = 8
if simConfig == 5:
EvilPeerTypeSweep = ["colluded"]
NumPeersSweep = [20]
pNumEvilPeersSweep = [0.0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30]
SeedSweep = [0x1, Ox2, Ox3]
221 if rnd > 0 and (rnd-1) in self.lastmessage-exists:
222 if self.last-message-exists[rnd-1] == False:
223 self.simEventStop.set()
224 return
225
226 # If we already saw the last message in this round
227 if rnd in self.last-message-exists and self.last-message-exists[rnd] == True:
228 return
229
230 # Look for all messages inserted inside peers on the network
231 for (_, _, last-pid) in self.messageinserts:
232 # Look for the inserted message in the decoded objects
233 for p in decoded-objects:
234 if str(p) == last-pid:
235 self.last-message-exists[rnd] = True
236 return
237 # Look for the inserted message in the gossip objects
238 for lc in gossip-objects:
239 for p in lc.messages:
240 if str(p) == lastpid:
241 self.last-messageexists[rnd] = True
242 return
243
244 self.last-messageexists[rnd] = False
245
246 def message-insert(self, rnd, nid, pid):
247 if len(self.message-decodes) < self.simParams['SIMWARMUP_DECODES']:
248 return
249
250 # If we have already collected our simulation number of inserts
251 if len(self.messageinserts) >= self .simParamsE['SIMDURATIONINSERTS']:
252 return
253
254 self.message-inserts.append( (rnd, nid, pid)
255
256 def message-decode(self, rnd, nid, pid):
257 # If we hadn't started recording this PID yet
258 if pid not in self.message-decodes:
259 self.message-decodes[pid] = []
260
261 # If this nid already decoded this pid in the past
262 if nid in [ n for (_, n) in self .message-decodes[pid] ]:
263 return
264
265 self .message-decodes[pid] .append( (rnd, nid)
266
267 def matrix-reduce(self, rnd, nid, numrows, numcols, numsolved):
268 self .matrix-reduces.append( (rnd, nid, numrows, numcols, numsolved)
269
270 def window-size(self, rnd, nid, solved-size, gossip-size):
271 self.window-sizes.append( (rnd, nid, solvedsize, gossip-size)
272
273 def finished(self, rnd):
274 self.round-finished = rnd
275
276 #########################
277
278 def dump(self):
279 i = 0
280 while True:
281 path = "data/%s-/d.data" % (self.simParams['NAME'], i)
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282 if not os.path.exists(path): break
283 i += 1
284
285 f = open(path, "w")
286 data = {'simParams': self.simParams,
287 'message-inserts': self.message-inserts,
288 'message-decodes': self.messagedecodes,
289 'matrix-reduces': self.matrix-reduces,
290 'window-sizes': self.window-sizes,
291 'round-finished': self.round-finished}
292 f.write(json.dumps(data))
293 f.close()
294
295 return path
296
297 ################################################################################
298
299 class LogO:
300 def __init__(self, simParams):
301 self.elog = []
302 self.simParams = simParams
303
304 def log(self, rnd, etype, enid, emsg):
305 e = {}
306 e['time'] = rnd
307 e['type'] = etype
308 e['nid'] = enid
309 e['msg'] = emsg
310 ejson = json.dumps(e)
311 self.elog.append(ejson)
312
313 if self.simParams['PRINT-LOG']:
314 if etype == "join" or etype == "leave": print(termcolor.colored(ejson, "yellow"))
315 elif etype == "receive": print(termcolor.colored(ejson, "yellow"))
316 elif etype == "insert": print(termcolor.colored(ejson, "red"))
317 elif etype == "reduce": print(termcolor.colored(ejson, "blue"))
318 elif etype == "decode": print(termcolor.colored(ejson, "green"))
319 else: print(termcolor.colored(ejson, "white"))
320
321 def dump(self):
322 i = 0
323 while True:
324 path = "logs/%s-Xd.log" % (self.simParamsE'NAME'], i)
325 if not os.path.exists(path): break
326 i += 1
327
328 f = open(path, "w")
329 for e in self.elog:
330 f.write(e + "\n")
331 f.close()
332
333 return path
334
335 ###########################################################################
336
337 class Networko:
338 def __init__(self, simlog, simstats):
339 self.simlog = simlog
340 self.simstats = simstats
341 self.network = {}
342
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343 def join(self, rnd, nid, q):
344 self.network[nid] = q
345 self.simlog.log(rnd, "join", nid, "")
346
347 def leave(self, rnd, nid):
348 if nid in self.network:
349 del self.network[nid]
350 self.simlog.log(rnd, "leave", nid, "")
351
352 def lookup-random(self, nid, n):
353 choices = list(self.network.keyso)
354 choices.remove(nid)
355 random.shuffle(choices)
356 return [self .network[choices[i]] for i in range(n)]
357
358 ###########################################################################
359
360 class Messageo:
361 def __init__(self, pid):
362 self.pid = pid
363
364 def __str__(self):
365 return self.pid
366
367 def __eq__(self, other):
368 if (self.pid == other.pid):
369 return True
370 return False
371
372 class DummyMessage(Message):
373 def __init__(self):
374 Message.__init__(self, "R/,04x" % random.getrandbits(32))
375
376 class RealMessage(Message):
377 def __init__(self, nid):
378 Message.__init__(self, "M/d/X04x" X (nid, random.getrandbits(32)))
379
380 class EvilMessage(Message):
381 def -_init__(self, nid):
382 Message.__init__(self, "E/d/%04x" X (nid, random.getrandbits(32)))
383
384 class RLC(Message):
385 def __init__(self, messages):
386 coefs = [random.randint(0, 255) for p in messages]
387 pid = "LC/(" + ",".join([p.pid for p in messages]) + ")" + "I" + \
388 ",".join([",02x" X c for c in coefs]) + ")"
389 Message.__init__(self, pid)
390 self.messages = messages
391 self.coefs = coefs
392
393 ########################################################################
394
395 def choose-weighted-random(objects, scores):
396 scores-cdf = [
397 for s in scores[:]:
398 scores-cdf.append(sum(scores-cdf) + s)
399
400 random-score = random.randomo*scorescdf [-1]
401 for index in range(len(scores-cdf)):
402 if scores-cdf [index] > random-score:
403 break
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404
405 return index
406
407 class Windowo:
408 def __init__(self, keep-expired = False):
409 self.window = []
410 self.ttl = {}
411 self.keep-expired = keep-expired
412
413 def add(self, p, ttl):
414 if type(p) == type(None) or p in self.window:
415 return False
416
417 self.window.append(p)
418 self.ttl[str(p)] = ttl
419 return True
420
421 def prune(self):
422 if self.keep-expired:
423 return E]
424
425 # Create a list of expired objects
426 expiredList = list(filter(lambda x: self .ttl[str(x)] == 0, self.window))
427
428 # Remove all expired objects from our window
429 for e in expiredList:
430 self.window.remove(e)
431 del self.ttl[str(e)]
432
433 return expiredList
434
435 def tick(self):
436 # Decrement the TTL for each object in the window
437 for x in self.window:
438 self.ttl[str(x)] = max(0, self.ttl[str(x)] - 1)
439
440 return self.prune()
441
442 def live.objects(self):
443 return list(filter(lambda x: self.ttl[str(x)] > 0, self.window))
444
445 def objects(self):
446 return self.window[:]
447
448 def __str__(self):
449 s = "Window\n"
450 for x in self.window:
451 s += "\t" + str(x) + TTL: " + str(self.ttl[str(x)]) + "\n"
452 return s
453
454 class Decoded Window(Window):
455 def __init__(self):
456 Window.__init__(self, keep-expired = True)
457
458 def choose-random-uniform(self, n):
459 choices = self.live-objects()
460 random.shuffle(choices)
461 return choices[0 : min(n, len(choices))]
462
463 def choose.random(self, n):
464 choices = self.live-objects()
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465 scores = [self.ttl[str(c)] for c in choices]
466
467 n = min(n, len(choices))
468 chosen = []
469 for i in range(n):
470 k = choose-weighted-random(choices, scores)
471 chosen.append(choices[k])
472 del choices[k]
473 del scores[k]
474
475 return chosen
476
477 class GossipWindow(Window):
478 def __init__(self):
479 Window.__init__(self, keep-expired = False)
480 # Keep active objects in a dictionary by source as well
481 self.active-objects-by-source = {}
482
483 def add(self, src, p, ttl):
484 if Window.add(self, p, ttl) == True:
485 # Create a new list for the source if it's not in our dictionary
486 if src not in self.active-objects-bysource:
487 self.active-objects-by-source[src] = []
488
489 # Add the message to the source's list
490 self.active-objects-by-source[src].append(p)
491 return True
492
493 return False
494
495 def prune(self):
496 expiredList = Window.prune(self)
497 # For each expired object
498 for e in expiredList:
499 for src in self.active-objects-by-source:
500 # If the object exists in this source's list
501 if e in self.active-objects-by-source[src]:
502 # Delete it
503 self.active-objects-by-source[src].remove(e)
504 # Delete the source's list if it's empty now
505 if len(self.active-objects-by-source[src]) == 0:
506 del self.active-objects-by-source[src)
507 break
508 return expiredList
509
510 def choose-random-uniform(self):
511 # Choose a random source
512 source = random.choice(list(self.active-objects-by-source.keys())
513
514 # Gather a list of objects by this source
515 objects = self. active-objects-by-source [source]
516
517 return random.choice(objects)
518
519 def choose random(self):
520 # Choose a random source
521 source = random.choice(list(self.active-objects-by-source.keys())
522
523 # Gather a list of objects by this source
524 choices = self.active-objects-by-source[source]
525 scores = [self.ttl[str(c)] for c in choices]
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526
527 return choices[chooseweighted-random(choices, scores)]
528
529 def fast-rref(self, m, b, x):
530 done = False
531 pi = 0
532
533 # Iterate through each row
534 for j in range(len(m)):
535 # While we do not have a pivot for this row
536 while m[ij][pi == 0:
537 # Find a row below to swap with for a pivot at pi
538 for k in range(j+1, len(m)):
539 if m[k]lpi] 1= 0:
540 # Swap with this row
541 (m[j], m[k]) = (m[k], m[j])
542 (b[j], b[k]) = (bik], b[j])
543 break
544
545 # Increment pivot index if we could not find a row to swap with
546 if m[ji][pi] == 0:
547 pi += 1
548
549 # If there is no pivots left, we're done reducing
550 if pi == len(m[O]):
551 done = True
552 break
553
554 if done:
555 break
556
557 # Divide through to have a pivot of 1
558 m[ij] = ff.FiniteFieldArray.ff-elemdiv(m[j][i], m[j][pi]) for i in range(len(m[0])) ]
559
560 # Eliminate above & below
561 for k in range(len(m)):
562 if k != j and m[k][pi] != 0:
563 m[k] = [ ff.FiniteFieldArray.ff-elemsub(m[k][i],
564 ff.FiniteFieldArray.ffelemmul(m[jJ[i], mk][pi])) for i in range(len(m[0])) 
565
566 # Move onto the next pivot
567 pi += 1
568 # If there is no pivots left, we're done reducing
569 if pi == len(m[O]):
570 break
571
572 solved = []
573 used = U]
574
575 for i in range(len(m)):
576 # If this row has only one non-zero entry
577 reducedcoefs = [1*(m[i][j] != 0) for j in range(len(m[0]))]
578 if sum(reduced-coefs) == 1:
579 # Add the solution to our solved list
580 solved.append(x[reduced-coefs.index(i)])
581 # Add the decoded LC to our used list
582 used.append(b[i])
583
584 return (solved, used)
585
586 def solve(self, decoded-window):
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unsolved-message-map = {}587
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# Assemble x of mx=b
# x maps messages to column indices
x = {}
# Assign a col index to each referenced decoded message
for p in ref-decodedmessages:
x[str(p)] = len(x)
# Assign a col index to each undecoded message
for lc in undecoded-1c:
for p in lc.messages:
if str(p) not in x:
x[str(p)] = len(x)
unsolved-message-map[str(p)] = p
# Assemble
m = []
b = [
# Create a
m and b of mx = b
row for each solved message
for p in ref-decoded-messages:
r = [0] * len(x)
r[x[str(p)]] = 1
m.append(r)
b.append(p)
# Create a row for each linear combination
for lc in undecoded-1c:
r = [0) * len(x)
for i in range(len(lc.messages)):
pid = str(lc.messages[i])
coef = lc.coefs[i]
r[x[pid]] = coef
m.append(r)
b.append(lc)
# Information about the size of this reduce attempt
b-pids = Estr(p) for p in b]
m-numrows = len(m)
m-numcols = len(m[0]) if m-numrows > 0 else 0
(solved, used) = self.fastrref(m, b, sorted(x, key=x.get))
# Remove previously decoded objects from our solution
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# Get a list of decoded messages
decoded-messages = decoded-window. objects )
# Make a list of undecoded linear combinations
undecoded_lc = []
for lc in self.live-objectso:
# If we've decoded this entire linear combination, don't add it
if sum([p in decoded-messages for p in lc.messages]) == len(lc.messages):
continue
undecoded-lc.append(lc)
# Put together a list of all decoded messages referenced by undecoded
# linear combinations
ref-decoded-messages = []
for lc in undecoded-lc:
for p in lc.messages:
if p in decoded-messages and p not in ref-decoded-messages:
ref-decoded-messages.append(p)
648 for p in refdecoded-messages:
649 if str(p) in solved:
650 solved.remove(str(p))
651 if p in used:
652 used.remove(p)
653
654 # Map message ids to message objects in our solution
655 for i in range(len(solved)):
656 solved[i] = unsolved-message-map[solved[i]]
657
658 # Information about the solution of this reduce attempt
659 s.pids = [str(p) for p in solved]
660
661 return (m-numrows, mnumcols, b-pids, s-pids, solved)
662
663 ################################################################################
664
665 class EvilPeero:
666 def __init-_(self, nid, network, simlog, simstats, simParams):
667 # Our unique peer ID
668 self.nid = nid
669 # Network, Log, Stats handles
670 self.network = network
671 self.simlog = simlog
672 self.simstats = simstats
673 # Simulation parameters
674 self.simParams = simParams
675
676 # Create a solved message window
677 self.decoded-window = DecodedWindow()
678
679 # Create an input queue
680 self.queue = queue.Queue()
681
682 # Join the network
683 self.network.join(0, nid, self.queue)
684
685
686 class EvilPeer-Inactive(EvilPeer):
687 def simulate(self, rnd):
688 # Process all received gossip
689 while not self.queue.emptyo:
690 try: (src, gossip) = self.queue.get(False)
691 except queue.Empty: break
692 # Throw it away...
693
694 class EvilPeerUnderdetermined(EvilPeer):
695 def simulate(self, rnd):
696 # Process all received gossip
697 while not self.queue.emptyo:
698 try: (src, gossip) = self.queue.get(False)
699 except queue.Empty: break
700 # Throw it away...
701
702 # Send our own gossip
703 dests = self.network.lookup-random(self.nid, self.simParams['SIM NUMPEERS'] - 1)
704 for d in dests:
705 # Code some gossip based on our Decoded Window
706 gossip = []
707
708 # Code an RLC of new messages
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gossip.append(RLC([EvilMessage(self.nid) for i in range(self.simParams 'CODESIZE'])]))
710
711 # Transmit to the destination
712 d.put( (self.nid, gossip)
713
714 class EvilPeerDecodable(EvilPeer):
715 def simulate(self, rnd):
716 # Update the TTLs of our object windows
717 self.decoded-window.tick()
718
719 # Keep our decoded window filled with our own messages
720 for i in range(self.simParams['CODESIZE'] - len(self.decoded-window.live-objectso)):
721 self.decoded-window.add(EvilMessage(self.nid), self.simParams['CODESIZE'])
722
723 # Process all received gossip
724 while not self.queue.emptyo:
725 try: (src, gossip) = self.queue.get(False)
726 except queue.Empty: break
727 # Throw it away...
728
729 # Send our own gossip
730 dests = self.network.lookup-random(self.nid, self.simParams['SIMNUMPEERS'] - 1)
731 for d in dests:
732 # Code some gossip based on our Decoded Window
733 gossip = [
734
735 # Send RLCs of our current decoded window
736 gossip.append(RLC(self.decoded-window.choose-random(self.simParams('CODESIZE'])))
737
738 # Transmit to the destination
739 d.put( (self.nid, gossip)
740
741 ################################################################################
742
743 class Peero:
744 def __init__(self, nid, network, simlog, simstats, simParams):
745 # Our unique peer ID
746 self.nid = nid
747 # Network, Log, Stats handles
748 self.network = network
749 self.simlog = simlog
750 self.simstats = simstats
751 # Simulation parameters
752 self.simParams = simParams
753
754 # Create an input queue
755 self.queue = queue.Queue()
756 # Create a solved message window
757 self.decoded-window = DecodedWindow()
758 # Create a gossip window
759 self.gossip-window = Gossip-Window()
760
761 # Initialize our window with dummy messages
762 for i in range(self.simParams['CODESIZE']):
763 self.decoded-window.add(DummyMessageO, self.simParams['TTLDECODE'])
764
765 # Choose a random insert message timeout
766 self. insert-message-timeout = int(random.randint(0, int(self. simParams ['CONTRIBUTE_INTERVAL')))
767
768 # Join the network
769 self.network.join(0, nid, self.queue)
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770
771 def simulate(self, rnd):
772 # Update the TTLs of our object windows
773 self.decodedwindow.tick()
774 self.decoded-window.prune()
775 self.gossipwindow.tick()
776 self.gossipwindow.prune()
777 # Keep track of the last message disappearing
778 self. simstats.message-track(rnd, self .decoded-window. live-objectso, self .gossip-window.live-objectso)
779 # Log our window sizes
780 self. simstats.window-size(rnd, self.nid, len(self .decoded_window.objects(), len(self .gossip-window.objects(0))
781
782 # Update our insert message timeout counter
783 if self.insert-message-timeout > 0:
784 self.insert-message-timeout -= 1
785
786 # Introduce a new message if our random insert timeout expired, but only
787 # if we've have a Decoded Window of at least CODESIZE
788 if self.insert-message-timeout == 0:
789 p = RealMessage(self.nid)
790 # Add a real message to our decoded window
791 if self.decoded-window.add(p, self.simParams['TTLDECODE']):
792 # Log the insert
793 self.simlog.log(rnd, "insert", self.nid, str(p))
794 self.simstats.message-insert(rnd, self.nid, str(p))
795
796 # Choose a new insert message timeout
797 #self. insert message-timeout = int(random.expovariate(1.0 / float(self. simParams ['CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL'])))
798 self. insertmessagetimeout = int (self. simParams ['CONTRIBUTE_INTERVAL'])
799
800 # Process all received gossip
801 while not self.queue.empty(:
802 try: (src, gossip) = self.queue.get(False)
803 except queue.Empty: break
804
805 # Add the linear combinations to our gossip window
806 for lc in gossip:
807 self.gossip-window.add(src, lc, self.simParams['TTL_GOSSIP'])
808
809 # Log the receive
810 self.simlog.log(rnd, "receive", self.nid, "src: Xd, gossip: *Is" % (src, str([str(p) for p in gossip])))
811
812 # Try to solve some gossip
813 (m-numrows, m-numcols, b-pids, s-pids, solved) = self.gossip-window.solve(self.decoded-window)
814 # Log the reduce attempt
815 self.simlog.log(rnd, "reduce", self.nid, "Xdxd to %d" % (m-numrows, mnumcols, len(solved)))
816 self.simstats.matrix-reduce(rnd, self.nid, mnumrows, mnumcols, len(solved))
817 self.simlog.log(rnd, "reduce-info", self.nid, "%s to %s" % (str(b-pids), str(s-pids)))
818
819 # Add the decoded messages to our Decoded Window
820 for p in solved:
821 if self.decoded-window.add(p, self.simParams['TTLDECODE']):
822 # Log the decodes
823 self.simlog.log(rnd, "decode", self.nid, str(p))
824 if isinstance(p, RealMessage):
825 self.simstats.message-decode(rnd, self.nid, str(p))
826
827 # Fill up Decoded Window with dummy messages if it is short
828 for i in range(self.simParams['CODESIZE'] - len(self.decodedwindow.live-objects()):
829 self.decodedwindow.add(DummyMessage(, self. simParams ['TTLDECODE'])
830
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831 # Look up LOOKUPPERCENT subset of peers on the network
832 dests = self.network.lookup-random(self.nid, int(self.simParams['LOOKUPPERCENT']*self.simParams['SIMNUM-PEERS']))
833 for d in dests:
834 gossip = []
835
836 if random.getrandbits(1):
837 # Code new-gossip from our Decoded Window
838 gossip.append(RLC(self.decoded-window.choose-random(self. simParams 'CODESIZE'])))
839 else:
840 # Choose re-gossip from our Gossip Window
841 if len(self.gossip-window.live-objectso) > 0:
842 gossip.append(self.gossip-window.choose-randomo)
843
844 # Transmit to the destination
845 d.put( (self.nid, gossip)
846
847
848 ##########################*####################################################
849
850 if __name__ == "__main-_:
851 ff.FiniteFieldArray.ff-precompute()
852
853 for si in range(len(SimParamsList)):
854 simParams = SimParamsList[si]
855
856 # If we have already completed this simulation, skip it
857 if os.path.exists("data/Xs-0.data" X simParams['NAME']):
858 continue
859
860 random.seed(simParams[iSEED'])
861
862 # Simulation stop event set by simStats
863 simEventStop = threading.Event()
864
865 # Simulation objects
866 simStats = Stats(simParams, simEventStop)
867 simLog = Log(simParams)
868 simNetwork = Network(simLog, simStats)
869
870 simPeers = []
871 # Add cooperative peers to the network
872 for i in range(simParams[ISIMNUM_PEERS'] - simParams['SIMNUMEVILPEERS']):
873 simPeers.append(Peer(i, simNetwork, simLog, simStats, simParams))
874 # Add evil peers to the network
875 for i in range(simParams['SIM_NUMEVILPEERS']):
876 if simParams['SIMEVIL-PEERTYPE'] == "inactive":
877 evilPeer = EvilPeerInactive
878 elif simParems['SIMEVIL-PEERTYPE'] == "underdetermined":
879 evilPeer = EvilPeerUnderdetermined
880 elif simParams['SIM_EVILPEERTYPE'] == "decodable":
881 evilPeer = EvilPeerDecodable
882
883 simPeers.append(evilPeer(i + (simParems[I'SIM_NUM_PEERS'] - simParams [I 'SIMNUM_EVILPEERS']),
884 simNetwork, simLog, simStats, simParams))
885
886 print("\nStarting simulation %d / %d: %s" % (si+1, len(SimParamsList), simParams['NAME']))
887
888 roundCount = 0
889 while True:
890 # Simulate the peers in a different order each round
891 random.shuffle(simPeers)
87
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# Dump stats
print("Wrote
# Dump log
print("Wrote
stats to 7s" 7. simStats.dumpO)
log to %s" % simLog.dumpo)
A.2 ff.py
# Finite Field Arithmetic Implementation
class FiniteFieldArrayo:
*## Predefined finite
FIELDSIZE = 8
PRIMITIVEPOLY = Ox1B
GENERATOR = 0x03
field characteristics
ELEMENTNUM = 0
ELEMENTMASK = 0
ff-exp-table = []
ff-log-table = []
ff-sqrt-table = []
ff-mul-table = {}
ff-div-table = {}
21
22 ### Precomputation of finite field exponent, logarithm, and square root
23 ### tables for fast multiplication, division, and square root
24
@staticmethod
def ff-precomputeo:
# Setup constants associated with this field size
FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM = 2**FiniteFieldArray.FIELDSIZE
FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTMASK = FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM-1
MSBMASK = (FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTMASK >> 1)+1
# Slow finite field multiplication used to precompute exponent
# and logarithm tables
def ff-slow-mul(a, b):
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for n in simPeers:
n.simulate(roundCount)
sys.stdout.write("\rd, %d -- Round %d" % \
(len(simStats.message-inserts), len(simStats.message-decodes), roundCount+1))
# Stop the simulation if we've collected enough data
if simEventStop.is-seto:
break
roundCount += 1
# Log the finish at this round count
simStats.finished(roundCount)
simLog.log(roundCount, "finish", 0, "")
print()
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35 p = 0
36 for i in range(FiniteFieldArray.FIELDSIZE):
37 if (b & Oxl):
38 p -= a
39 if (a & MSBMASK):
40 a <<= 1
41 a &= FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTMASK
42 a ^= FiniteFieldArray.PRIMITIVEPOLY
43 else:
44 a <<= 1
45 a &= FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTMASK
46 b >>= 0x1
47 return p
48
49 # Precompute exponent and logarithm table
50 FiniteFieldArray.ff-exptable = [0] * FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM
51 FiniteFieldArray.ff-log-table = [0] * FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM
52 FiniteFieldArray.ff-exp-table[0] = Ox0I
53 for i in range(1, FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM):
54 FiniteFieldArray.ff-exp-table[i] = \
55 ffslowmul(FiniteFieldArray.ff-exp-table[i-1], FiniteFieldArray.GENERATOR)
56 FiniteFieldArray.ff-log-table[FiniteFieldArray.ff-exp-table[i3] = i
57
58 # Slow finite field square root used to precompute square root table
59 def ff-slow-sqrt(x):
60 for i in range(FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM):
61 if FiniteFieldArray.ff-elem-mul-slow(i, i) == x:
62 return i
63 raise ValueError("Xd has no squareroot in (2**%d, Ox%02X, Ox%02X)!" \
64 X (x, FiniteFieldArray.PRIMITIVEPOLY, FiniteFieldArray.GENERATOR))
65
66 # Precompute square root table
67 FiniteFieldArray.ff-sqrttable = [0] * FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM
68 for i in range(FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM):
69 try:
70 FiniteFieldArray.ff-sqrttable[i] = ff-slow-sqrt(i)
71 except ValueError:
72 FiniteFieldArray.ff-sqrt-table[i] = None
73
74 # Precompute multiplication table
75 for a in range(FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM):
76 FiniteFieldArray.ff-mul-table[a] = {}
77 for b in range(FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM):
78 FiniteFieldArray.ff -mul-table[a] [b] = FiniteFieldArray.ff elem-mul-slow(a, b)
79
80 # Precompute division table
81 for a in range(FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM):
82 FiniteFieldArray.ff-div-table[a] = {}
83 for b in range(FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM-1):
84 FiniteFieldArray.ff-div-table[a][b+1] = FiniteFieldArray. ffelem-div-slow(a, b+1)
85
86 ########################################################################
87 ########################################################################
88
89 ### Element-wise finite field addition, subtraction, multiplication,
90 ### and division
91
92 Qstaticmethod
93 def ff-elem-add(a, b):
94 return a - b
95
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96 @staticmethod
97 def ff-elem-sub(a, b):
98 return a - b
99
100 Qstaticmethod
101 def ff-elem-mul-slow(a, b):
102 if a == 0 or b == 0: return 0
103 # a * b = exp(log(a)) * exp(log(b)) = exp(log(a) + log(b))
104 exp-index = FiniteFieldArray.ff-log-table[a] + FiniteFieldArray.ff-log-table[b]
105 expindex %= FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTMASK
106 return FiniteFieldArray.ff.exptabletexp-index]
107
108 @staticmethod
109 def ff-elemnmul(a, b):
110 return FiniteFieldArray.ff-mul-table[a][b)
111
112 @staticmethod
113 def ff-elem-div-slow(a, b):
114 if (b == 0): raise ZeroDivisionError
115 # a / b = a * (1/b)
116 b-inverse = FiniteFieldArray.ff-exptable[FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTMASK - FiniteFieldArray.fflog-table[b]]
117 return FiniteFieldArray.ff-elem-mul(a, b-inverse)
118
119 @staticmethod
120 def ff-elem-div(a, b):
121 if (b == 0): raise ZeroDivisionError
122 return FiniteFieldArray.ff-div-table[a][b]
123
124 Ostaticmethod
125 def ff-elem-sqrt(a):
126 return FiniteFieldArray.ff-sqrt-table[a]
127
128 ########################################################################
129
130 @staticmethod
131 def ff-bytearray-to-elemarray(x):
132 if FiniteFieldArray.FIELDSIZE != 8: raise \
133 ValueError("ff-bytearray-to-elemarray unimplemented for FF 2**%d" X
134 FiniteFieldArray.FIELDSIZE)
135 return list(x)
136
137 Ostaticmethod
138 def ff-elemarray-to-bytearray(x):
139 if FiniteFieldArray.FIELD-SIZE != 8: raise \
140 ValueError("ff-elemarray-to-bytearray unimplemented for FF 2**d" X\
141 FiniteFieldArray.FIELDSIZE)
142 return bytearray(x)
143
144 ########################################################################
145 ########################################################################
146
147 def __init__(self, x = None):
148 self.raw-bytes = bytearray([])
149 if x is not None:
150 raw-bytes = bytearray(x)
151 if len(raw-bytes) % (FiniteFieldArray.FIELDSIZE/8) != 0:
152 raise ValueError("invalid byte array size for FF 2**/d" X FiniteFieldArray.FIELDSIZE)
153 self.raw-bytes = raw-bytes
154
155 ### Overloaded operators for scalar multiplication, scalar divison,
156 ### array addition, array subtraction, equality, and string
90
157 ### representation
158
159 # FiniteFieldArray[i] = scalar
160 def __getitem-_(self, index):
161 return self.raw.bytes[index]
162
163 # len(FiniteFieldArray) = len(self.raw-bytes)
164 def _-len__(self):
165 return len(self.raw-bytes)
166
167 # FiniteFieldArray + FiniteFieldArray = FiniteFieldArray
168 def __add__(self, other):
169 if not isinstance(other, FiniteFieldArray): raise TypeError("other is not a FiniteFieldArray")
170 elif len(self.raw-bytes) != len(other.rawbytes): raise ValueError("other is not same size")
171
172 my-elemarray = FiniteFieldArray.ff bytearray-to-elemarray(self.rawbytes)
173 other-elemarray = FiniteFieldArray. ffbytearray-to-elemarray (other. raw-bytes)
174 sum-elemarray = [FiniteFieldArray.ff-elem-add(my-elemarray[i], \
175 other-elemarray[i]) for i in range(len(my-elemarray)))
176 return FiniteFieldArray(FiniteFieldArray.ff-elemarray-to-bytearray(sumnelemarray))
177
178 # FiniteFieldArray - FiniteFieldArray = FiniteFieldArray
179 def __sub__(self, other):
180 return self.__add__(other)
181
182 # FiniteFieldArray * FiniteFieldArray = scalar (inner product)
183 # FiniteFieldArray * scalar = FiniteFieldArray
184 def __mul__(self, other):
185 if isinstance(other, FiniteFieldArray):
186 if len(self.rawhbytes) != len(other.raw-bytes):
187 raise ValueError("other is not same size")
188
189 my-elemarray = FiniteFieldArray.ff-bytearray-to-elemarray(self.raw-bytes)
190 other-elemarray = FiniteFieldArray.ff-bytearray-to-elemarray(other.raw-bytes)
191 x = 0
192 for i in range(len(my-elemarray)):
193 x = FiniteFieldArray.ff-elem-add(x, FiniteFieldArray.ff-elem-mul(my-elemarray[i], other-elemarray[i]))
194 return x
195 elif isinstance(other, int):
196 if other < 0 or other > FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM-1:
197 raise ValueError("other is outside of finite field")
198
199 my-elemarray = FiniteFieldArray.ff-bytearray-to.elemarray(self.raw-bytes)
200 mulelemarray = [FiniteFieldArray.ff-elem-mul(my-elemarray[i], other) for i in range(len(my-elemarray))]
201 return FiniteFieldArray(FiniteFieldArray.ff-elemarray-to-bytearray(mul-elemarray))
202 else:
203 raise TypeError("unknown other")
204
205 # FiniteFieldArray * FiniteFieldArray = scalar (inner product)
206 # scalar * FiniteFieldArray = FiniteFieldArray
207 def __rmul__(self, other):
208 return self.__mul__(other)
209
210 # FiniteFieldArray / scalar = FiniteFieldArray
211 def __truediv__(self, other):
212 if not isinstance(other, int): raise TypeError("other is not a scalar integer")
213 elif other < 0 or other > FiniteFieldArray.ELEMENTNUM-1: raise ValueError("other is outside of finite field")
214
215 my-elemarray = FiniteFieldArray.f fbytearray-to-elemarray(self.rawbytes)
216 divelemarray = [FiniteFieldArray.ff.elem.div(my-elemarray[i], other) for i in range(len(my-elemarray))]
217 return FiniteFieldArray(FiniteFieldArray.ff-elemarray-to-bytearray(div-elemarray))
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218
219 # FiniteFieldArray == FiniteFieldArray
220 def __eq__(self, other):
221 if not isinstance(other, FiniteFieldArray): return False
222 return self.raw-bytes == other.raw-bytes
223
224 # str(FiniteFieldArray)
225 def __str-_(self):
226 hexstr = ""
227 for i in range(len(self.rawbytes)):
228 hexstr += ("XO2x" % self.raw.bytes[i]) +
229 #if i == 0: continue
230 #elif (i+1) % 64 == 0 and i+1 != len(self.rawbytes): hexstr += "\n"
231 #elif (i+1) X 2 == 0: hexstr +=
232 return hexstr
233
234 def ff-rref(m, b):
235 # m is an array of FiniteFieldArray rows
236 # b is an array of the right hand column
237
238 pi = 0
239
240 # Iterate through each row
241 for j in range(len(m)):
242 # While we do not have a pivot for this row
243 while m[j][pi] == 0:
244 # Find a row below to swap with for a pivot at pi
245 for k in range(j+1, len(m)):
246 if m[k][pij != 0:
247 # Swap with this row
248 (m[j], m[k]) = (m[k], m[j])
249 (b[j], b[k]) = (b[k], b[j])
250 break
251
252 # Increment pivot index if we could not find a row to swap with
253 if m[j][pi == 0:
254 pi += 1
255
256 # If there is no pivots left, we're done reducing
257 if pi == len(m[0]):
258 return (m, b)
259
260 # Divide through to have a pivot of 1
261 m[j] /= m[j][pi]
262
263 # Eliminate above & below
264 for k in range(len(m)):
265 if k != j and m[k][pi] != 0:
266 m[k] = m[k] - (m[j]*m[k][pi])
267
268 # Move onto the next pivot
269 pi += 1
270 # If there is no pivots left, we're done reducing
271 if pi == len(m[0]):
272 break
273
274 return (m, b)
275
276 def ffsolutions(a, x, b):
277 (ap, bp) = ff-rref(a, b)
278
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279 solved = []
280 used = []
281 for i in range(len(ap)):
282 r = ap[i]
283 # If this row has only one non-zero entry
284 reduced-coefs = [r[j] != 0 for j in range(len(r))]
285 if sum(reducedcoefs) == 1:
286 # Add the solution to our solved list
287 solved.append(x[reduced-coefs.index(True)])
288 # Add the decoded LC to our used list
289 used.append(b[i])
290
291 return (solved, used)
292
293 def ff-rref-testo:
294 m = [ FiniteFieldArray([33, 247, 109, 71, 139]), \
295 FiniteFieldArray([97, 221, 102, 127, 72]), \
296 FiniteFieldArray([101, 126, 186, 90, 103]), \
297 FiniteFieldArray([59, 234, 145, 197, 122]), \
298 FiniteFieldArray([75, 9, 213, 9, 3))]
299 b = [1,2,3,4,51
300 (mp, bp) = ff-rref(m, b)
301 for i in range(len(mp)):
302 print(mp[i], "\t", b[i])
303 print("")
304
305 m = [ FiniteFieldArray([33, 247, 109, 71, 139]), \
306 FiniteFieldArray([97, 221, 102, 127, 72]), \
307 FiniteFieldArray([101, 126, 186, 90, 103]), \
308 2*FiniteFieldArray([97, 221, 102, 127, 72])]
309 b = [1,2,3,4]
310 (mp, bp) = ff-rref(m, b)
311 for i in range(len(mp)):
312 print(mp[i], "\t', b[i])
313 print("")
314
315 m = [ FiniteFieldArray([0, 247, 109, 71, 139]), \
316 FiniteFieldArray([97, 221, 102, 127, 72]), \
317 FiniteFieldArray([101, 126, 186, 90, 103]), \
318 2*FiniteFieldArray([97, 221, 102, 127, 72])]
319 b = [1,2,3,4]
320 (mp, bp) = ff-rref(m, b)
321 for i in range(len(mp)):
322 print(mp[i], "\t", b[i])
323 print("")
324
325 m = [ FiniteFieldArray([0, 0, 0, 71, 139]), \
326 FiniteFieldArray([0, 0, 1, 127, 72])]
327 b = [1,2]
328 (mp, bp) = ff-rref(m, b)
329 for i in range(len(mp)):
330 print(mp[i], "\t, b[i])
331 print("")
A.3 stats-process.py
1 #!/usr/bin/python3
2
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3 # Plotter for NCGAB Simulator Results
4
5 import sys
6 import json
7 import numpy
8 import pylab
9
10 ################################################################################
11
12 def avg(x):
13 return (sum(x) / float(len(x))) if len(x) > 0 else 0.0
14
15 def ci_95(x):
16 std = numpy.std(x)
17 ci = 1.96*std/numpy.sqrt(len(x))
18 return ci
19
20 class StatsProcessO):
21 def __init--(self, filename):
22 f = open(filename)
23 data = json.loads(f.reado))
24 print("Loaded %s %s" X (data['simParams'] ['NAME'], data['simParams'I['DESC']))
25 self.simParams = data['simParams']
26 self.message-inserts = data['message-inserts']
27 self.messagedecodes = data['message-decodes')
28 self.matrix-reduces = data['matrix-reduces'
29 self.window-sizes = data['window-sizes'
30 f.close()
31
32 #########################
33
34 def dump-decodes(self):
35 for i in range(len(self.message-inserts)):
36 (itime, nid, pid) = self.message.inserts[i]
37 print("[7.6f]: nid Xd, insert %s" % (itime, nid, pid))
38 ndecodes = 0
39 for (dtime, nid) in self.message.decodes[pid]:
40 print("\t[X.6f): nid %d, decode" % (dtime - itime, nid))
41 ndecodes += 1
42 print("\n\tnumber of decodes: %d / %d = %.2f %%\n" X (ndecodes, \
43 self.simParams['SIMNUM_PEERS'] - 1, 100.0 * float(ndecodes)/(self.simParams['SIMNUMPEERS']-1)))
44
45 def dump-reduces(self):
46 for (itime, nid, m, n, ns) in self.matrix-reduces:
47 print("[.6f]: nid %d, reduce XdxYd to %d" % (itime, nid, m, n, ns))
48
49 def dump-window-sizes(self):
50 for (t, nid, ss, gs) in self.windowsizes:
51 print("[X.6f]: nid %d, solved size %d, gossip size %d" % (t, nid, ss, gs))
52
53 #########################
54
55 def compute-delays(self):
56 delay-min = []
57 delay-max = [
58 delay.avg = [
59
60 # For each inserted message
61 for (itime, -, pid) in self.message-inserts:
62 # If it was decoded
63 if pid in self .message-decodes and len(self.message-decodes Epid]) > 0:
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64 # Calculated the delays to decoding
65 delays = [ (dtime - itime) for (dtime, _) in self.message-decodes[pid] ]
66 # Add it to our tables
67 delaymin.append( delays[0] )
68 delaymax.append( delays[-1] )
69 delay-avg.append( sum(delays) / float(len(delays)) )
70
71 return (delay-min, delaymax, delay-avg)
72
73 def compute-pdecodes(self):
74 times = [
75 pids = []
76 pdecode = []
77
78 # For each inserted message
79 for (time, -, pid) in self.message-inserts:
80 times.append(time)
81 pids.append(pid)
82 if pid in self.message-decodes and len(self.message-decodes[pid]) > 0:
83 pdecode.append( 100.0 * \
84 (float((len(self.message-decodes[pid]))) / \
85 float(self.simParams['SIMNUM_PEERS']-self.simParams['SIMNUMEVILPEERS']-1)))
86 else:
87 pdecode.append(0.0)
88
89 return (times, pids, pdecode)
90
91 def compute-avg-delay(self):
92 (_, _, delay-avg) = self.compute-delays()
93 return (numpy.mean(delay-avg), ci_95(delay-avg))
94
95 def compute-avg-pdecode(self):
96 (, -, pdecode) = self.compute-pdecodes()
97 pdecode-mean = numpy.mean(pdecode)
98 pdecode-std = numpy.std(pdecode)
99 pdecode-ci = 1.96*pdecode-std/numpy.sqrt(len(pdecode))
100 return (pdecode-mean, pdecode-ci)
101
102 #########################
103
104 def print.stats(self):
105 print(self.simParams['NAME'])
106
107 print("\tNum inserts: %d" X len(self.message-inserts))
108
109 (_, _, pdecode) = self.compute-pdecodes()
110 avg.pdecode = avg(pdecode)
111 print("\tDecode Percent: X.2f\t" X avgpdecode)
112
113 (delay-min, delay-max, delay-avg) = self.compute-delays()
114 avg-delay-min = avg(delay-min)
115 avg-delay-max = avg(delay-max)
116 avg-delay-avg = avg(delay-avg)
117 print("\tAvg Delay: X.6f" % avg-delay-avg)
118 print("\tMin Delay: X.6f" . avg-delay-min)
119 print("\tMax Delay: %.6f" X avg-delay-max)
120
121 print ()
122
123 #########################
124
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125 def plot-pdecodes-vs-time(self):
126 (times, pids, pdecode) = self.compute-pdecodes()
127 avg-pdecode = avg(pdecode)
128
129 pylab.figure()
130 pylab.plot(times, pdecode, 's')
131 pylab.vlines(times, 0, pdecode)
132 pylab.hlines(avg-pdecode, times[0], times [-1])
133 pylab.title('Final Decoding of Inserted messages')
134 pylab.xlabel('Time')
135 pylab.ylabel('Percent Peers Decode')
136 pylab.ylim([0, 101])
137
138 def plot-window-sizes-vs-time(self):
139 time = {}
140 solved-size = {}
141 gossip-size = {}
142
143 for (t, nid, ss, gs) in self.window-sizes:
144 if nid not in time:
145 time[nid] = ]
146 solved-size[nid] = []
147 gossip-size[nid] = []
148
149 time[nid).append(t)
150 solved-size[nid].append(ss)
151 gossip-size[nid].append(gs)
152
153 pylab.figure()
154 for nid in time.keyso:
155 pylab.plot(time[nid], solvedsize[nid])
156 pylab.title('Solved Window Size')
157 pylab.xlabel('Time')
158 pylab.ylabel('Items')
159
160 pylab.figure()
161 for nid in time.keyso:
162 pylab.plot(time[nid], gossipsize[nid])
163 pylab.title('Gossip Window Size')
164 pylab.xlabel('Time')
165 pylab.ylabel('Items')
166
167 ################################################################################
168
169 class StatsPloto:
170 def __init__(self, plotFilePrefix, statsProcList):
171 self.statsProcList = statsProcList
172 self.plotFilePrefix = plotFilePrefix
173
174 def plot-pdecode-vs-throughput(self):
175 data = {}
176 for sim in self.statsProcList:
177 params = sim.simParams
178 numPeers = params[SIMNUMPEERS']
179 contributeInterval = params['CONTRIBUTEINTERVAL']
180 if numPeers not in data:
181 data[numPeers] = {}
182 if contributeInterval not in data[numPeers]:
183 data[numPeers][contributeInterval] = []
184 data[numPeers] [contributeInterval] .append(sim.compute-avg-pdecode() [0])
185
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186 pylab.figure()
187 for numPeers in sorted(data.keyso):
188 x = sorted(data[numPeersl.keyso)
189 y = [ numpy.mean(datafnumPeers][r]) for r in x]
190 ci = [ ci_95(data[numPeers][r]) for r in x]
191 pylab.errorbar(x, y, yerr=ci, fmt="s-", label="N=%d" % numPeers)
192 pylab.xlabel('Contribution Interval')
193 pylab.xlim([5, 25])
194 pylab.ylabel('Average Percent Decode')
195 pylab.ylim([0, 105])
196 pylab.title('Availability vs. Contribution Interval')
197 pylab.legend(loc='lower right')
198 pylab.savefig(self.plotFilePref ix + "-availability.eps")
199
200 def plot-delay-vs-throughput(self):
201 data = {}
202 for sim in self.statsProcList:
203 params = sim.simParams
204 numPeers = params['SIMNUMPEERS']
205 contributeInterval = params['CONTRIBUTE_INTERVAL']
206 if numPeers not in data:
207 data[numPeers] {}
208 if contributeInterval not in data [numPeers]:
209 data[numPeers][contributeIntervalI = [I
210 data[numPeers][contributeInterval].append(sim.compute-avg-delay()[0])
211
212 pylab.figure()
213 for numPeers in sorted(data.keyso):
214 x = sorted(data[numPeers].keys())
215 y = [ numpy.mean(data[nuimPeers][r]) for r in x]
216 ci = E ci_95(data[numPeers][r]) for r in x]
217 pylab.errorbar(x, y, yerr=ci, fmt="s-", label="N=%d" 7 numPeers)
218 pylab.xlabel('Contribution Interval')
219 pylab.xlim([5, 25])
220 pylab.ylabel('Average Delay')
221 pylab.ylim(EO, 25])
222 pylab.title('Delay vs. Contribution Interval')
223 pylab.legendo
224 pylab.savefig(self.plotFilePref ix + "-delay.eps")
225
226 def plot-pdecode-vs-evil-nodes(self):
227
228 data = {}
229 for sim in self.statsProcList:
230 params = sim.simParams
231 numPeers = params['SIMNUMPEERS']
232 percentEvil = 100.0 * params['SIMNUMEVILPEERS'] / float(params['SIMNUMPEERS'])
233 if numPeers not in data:
234 data[numPeers] = {}
235 if percentEvil not in data[numPeers]:
236 data[nuimPeers][percentEvil] = []
237 data[numPeers][percentEvil].append(sim.compute-avg-pdecode()[0])
238
239 pylab.figure()
240 for numPeers in sorted(data.keyso):
241 x = sorted(data[numPeers].keyso)
242 y = E numpy.mean(data[numPeers][r]) for r in x]
243 ci = [ ci_95(data[numPeers][r]) for r in x]
244 pylab.errorbar(x, y, yerr=ci, fmt="s-", label="N=Xd" % numPeers)
245 pylab.xlabel('Percent Attackers')
246 pylab.xlim([-1, 31])
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247 pylab.ylabel('Average Percent Decoded')
248 pylab.ylim([O, 105])
249 pylab.title('Availability vs. Percent Attackers')
250 pylab.legend(loc='lower right')
251 pylab.savefig(self.plotFilePrefix + "-availability.eps")
252
253 def plot-delay.vs.evil-nodes(self):
254 data = {}
255 for sim in self.statsProcList:
256 params = sim.simParams
257 numPeers = params['SIMNUM-PEERS']
258 percentEvil = 100.0 * params['SIMNUMEVIL-PEERS'] / float(params['SIMNUMPEERS'])
259 if numPeers not in data:
260 data[numPeers] = {}
261 if percentEvil not in data[numPeers]:
262 data[ numPeers][percentEvil] = ]
263 data [numPeers] [percentEvil] .append(sim. compute-avg-delay() [0)
264
265 pylab.figure()
266 for numPeers in sorted(data.keyso):
267 x = sorted(data[numPeers].keyso)
268 y = [ numpy.mean(data[numPeers][r]) for r in x]
269 ci = ci-95(data[numPeers][r]) for r in x]
270 pylab.errorbar(x, y, yerr=ci, fmt="s-", label="N=d" X numPeers)
271 pylab.xlabel('Percent Attackers')
272 pylab.xlim([-1, 31])
273 pylab.ylabel('Average Delay')
274 pylab.ylim([0, 25])
275 pylab.title('Delay vs. Percent Attackers')
276 pylab.legend()
277 pylab.savefig(self.plotFilePrefix + "-delay.eps")
278
279 if __name__ == "--main_ :
280 if len(sys.argv) < 3:
281 print("Usage: <plot output prefix> <simulation data files ... >")
282 sys.exit(1)
283
284 # From http://www.scipy.org/Cookbook/Matplotlib/LaTeXExamples
285 figwidth-pt = 253.0
286 inches.per-pt = 1.0/72.27
287 golden-mean = (numpy.sqrt(5)-1.0)/2.0
288 fig-width = fig-width-pt*inches-per-pt
289 fig-height = fig.width*golden-mean
290 fig.size = [fig.width,fig-height]
291 params = {'backend': 'ps',
292 'axes.labelsize': 9,
293 'text.fontsize': 9,
294 'legend.fontsize': 9,
295 'xtick.labelsize': 7,
296 'ytick.labelsize': 7,
297 'text.usetex': True,
298 'figure.figsize': fig-size,
299 'figure.subplot.bottom': 0.15,
300 'font.size': 9,
301 'font.family': 'serif'}
302 pylab.rcParams.update(params)
303
304 plotFilePrefix = sys.argv[1]
305 simsToProcess = sys.argv[2:]
306
307 if len(simsToProcess) == 1:
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308 statsProc = StatsProcess(simsToProcess[0])
309 statsProc.print-stats()
310 statsProc.plot-pdecodes-vs-time()
311 statsProc.plotwindowsizesvs-time()
312 pylab.show()
313
314 elif len(simsToProcess) > 1:
315 statsProcList = [ StatsProcess(p) for p in simsToProcess
316
317 for s in statsProcList:
318 s.print-stats()
319
320 p = StatsPlot(plotFilePrefix, statsProcList)
321 if "Evil" in sys.argv[2]:
322 p.plot-pdecode-vs-evil-nodes()
323 p.plot-delay-vs-evil-nodes()
324 else:
325 p.plot-pdecode-vs-throughput()
326 p.plot-delay-vs-throughput()
327 pylab.showo)
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